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THE EXPRESSIVE CAPACITY OF
INTERNATIONAL PUNISHMENT: THE
LIMITS OF THE NATIONAL LAW
ANALOGY AND THE POTENTIAL OF
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW
ROBERT D. SLOANE ∗
INTRODUCTION
To date, scant attention has been paid to sentencing in international
criminal law (ICL); indeed, in the historic practice of international criminal
tribunals, “the sanction imposed often appears to be little more than an
1
afterthought.” This is understandable, for ICL as a field remains in its
infancy, but unfortunate, for punishment is the distinctive feature of criminal
law, and sentencing the vehicle through which it pursues and expresses its
objectives, both practical and moral. The absence of an articulated ICL
philosophy of or justification for punishment and the dearth of sentencing
principles can be ascribed chiefly to two factors: As a theoretical matter, the
abhorrent nature of ICL violations and the catastrophic circumstances that
serve as the principal catalyst for ICL’s development—the rupture, by war,
national, religious or ethnic conflict, or otherwise, of basic social norms
2
against brutal violence —invite “intuitive-moralistic answers,” making debate
about the rationales for punishing serious human rights atrocities seem
3
pejoratively academic; as a practical matter, perhaps in part for that reason,
the principal positive law instruments drafted to govern international trials of
ICL violations say remarkably little about the purposes of punishment and
∗

Associate Professor of Law, Boston University School of Law. I acknowledge with gratitude
the helpful comments of Mahnoush Arsanjani, Anthony Colangelo, Michael Dorf, Brandon Garrett,
Sasha Greenawalt, Paul Kahn, Hoi Kong, Tom Lee, Gerard E. Lynch, Thomas Pogge, W. Michael
Reisman, James J. Silk, and Jeremy Waldron.
1
William A. Schabas, International Sentencing: From Leipzig (1923) to Arusha (1996), in 3
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 171, 171 (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2d ed. 1999) [hereinafter
Schabas, International Sentencing]; see also José E. Alvarez, Crimes of States/Crimes of Hate:
Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 408 (1999); Allison Marston Danner, Constructing a
Hierarchy of Crimes in International Criminal Law Sentencing, 87 VA. L. REV. 415, 418, 434 & n.81
(2001).
2
Payam Akhavan, The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda: The Politics and
Pragmatics of Punishment, 90 AM. J. INT’L L. 501, 501 (1996) [hereinafter Akhavan, Politics and
Pragmatics].
3
See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR CRIMES
TRIBUNALS 13 (2000); Immi Tallgren, The Sensibility and Sense of International Criminal Law, 13
EUR. J. INT’L L. 561, 564 (2002).
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4

include comparably laconic sentencing provisions.
Punishment, however, whether authorized by international or national
5
6
law, requires justification; otherwise, it is simply cruelty. And sentencing
practices, international no less than national, should reflect and foster the goals
of punishment. Yet in penal theory, as elsewhere, “the mechanical transfer of
domestic criminal law principles to the international context . . . is fraught with
7
dangers.” Justifications for punishment common to national systems of
criminal law cannot be transplanted unreflectively to the distinct legal, moral,
8
and institutional context of ICL.
Use of the national law analogy in diverse areas of international legal
theory and practice boasts a long pedigree and an equally long and powerful
9
history of criticism. But application of the national law analogy proves
particularly problematic for ICL because it strives to combine the paradigms of
two very different legal fields: (1) classical international law—a profoundly
consensual body of law based on broadly shareable norms among nation-states
and occupied mainly with their rights and duties inter se; and (2) national
criminal law—a profoundly coercive body of law often understood to embody
the most fundamental norms and values of a local community, generally that of
10
a single nation-state (or political subdivision). In particular, ICL differs from
national criminal law in at least three significant ways that the national law
analogy can obscure.
4

RODNEY DIXON & KARIM KHAN, ARCHBOLD INTERNATIONAL: PRACTICE, PROCEDURE AND
EVIDENCE OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURTS 483 (2003); Mark Drumbl, Collective Violence and
Individual Punishment: The Criminality of Mass Atrocity, 99 NW. U. L. REV. 539, 551–52 (2005). See
United Nations Diplomatic Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, Rome, Italy, June 15–July 17, 1998, Rome Statute of the International Criminal
Court, art. 78, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9* (July 17, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 999 (1998) [hereinafter
Rome Statute]; The Secretary-General, Aspects of Establishing an International Tribunal for the
Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law
Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, 48th Sess., Annex, art. 113, U.N. Doc. S/25704
(May 3, 1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 955, art. 23, ¶2, U.N.
SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., Annex, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (Nov. 8, 1994), 33 I.L.M. 1598 (1994)
[hereinafter ICTR Statute].
5
For clarity, I use the adjective “national,” rather than the semantically equivalent “municipal,”
“internal,” or “domestic,” to refer to nation-states.
6
Kent Greenawalt, Punishment, 74 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 343, 346 (1983); see also Coker
v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584, 592 (1977) (describing punishment that does not contribute to any penal
goal as “nothing more than the purposeless and needless imposition of pain and suffering”).
7
Steven R. Ratner, The Schizophrenias of International Criminal Law, 33 TEX. INT’L L.J. 237,
251 (1998). For two recent critiques of this “mechanical transfer,” see Drumbl, supra note 4; Tallgren,
supra note 3; see also HANNAH ARENDT, EICHMANN IN JERUSALEM: A REPORT ON THE BANALITY OF
EVIL 291–92 (1963) (“Can we apply the same principle that is applied to a governmental apparatus in
which crime and violence are exceptions and borderline cases to a political order in which crime is
legal and the rule?”).
8
See BASS, supra note 3, at 13 (“The application of national law to war crimes is in many ways
the legal equivalent of a bad analogy.”); see also Tallgren, supra note 3, at 565–66. See generally
Laurel E. Fletcher & Harvey M. Weinstein, Violence and Social Repair: Rethinking the Contribution
of Justice to Reconciliation, 24 HUM. RTS. Q. 573 (2002) (critiquing the presumed merits of the
criminal justice model from the perspective of sociology and collective psychology); Mark J. Osiel,
Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity, 22 HUM. RTS. Q. 118 (2000) (surveying nine
critiques of the viability or propriety of criminal justice as a means of responding to mass atrocities).
9
E.g., Hedley Bull, Society and Anarchy in International Relations, in DIPLOMATIC
INVESTIGATIONS 35 (Herbert Butterfield and Martin Wright eds., 1966); see, e.g., GEORGE KENNAN,
AMERICAN DIPLOMACY, 1900–1950, at 95 (1951).
10
Louise Arbour, Progress and Challenges in International Criminal Justice, 21 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 531, 531 (1997); see also Tallgren, supra note 3, at 562.
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First, unlike national criminal law, ICL purports to serve multiple
communities, including both literal ones—for example, ethnic or national
communities—and the figurative “international community,” which, needless
to say, is not monolithic; it consists of multiple, often competing,
constituencies and interests. ICL attempts to mediate between the divergent
interests and goals of several bodies of law (national and international)
promulgated by these overlapping, but far from identical, constituencies. At
sentencing, arrayed against these diverse communal interests and objectives is
the convicted’s core liberty interest.
Second, the national law analogy can obscure the collective character
of ICL crimes (war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, and
aggression), a feature that distinguishes them from most similar crimes of
11
violence in the national sphere. Arguably, the collective nature of the victim
of international crimes—for example, a national, racial, or ethnic group—
aggravates the culpability of the perpetrator, just as the prejudicial motive and
harm of a bias crime render an assault or murder, for example, more
12
blameworthy because of secondary harms. At the same time, the collective
nature of the perpetrator—his role and status relative to the nation-state,
military organization, or other collective entity implicated by ICL crimes—
arguably mitigates culpability in some circumstances insofar as collectivity
might be thought to diffuse moral responsibility, mitigating each perpetrator’s
13
guilt in some proportion to that of the collective.
Third, perpetrators of ICL crimes often act in a normative universe that
differs dramatically from the relatively stable, well-ordered society that most
national criminal justice systems take as their baseline. ICL crimes typically
occur during periods of war, ethnic conflict, or other societal breakdown
characterized by the erosion, if not inversion, of basic social norms against
violence, either generally or relative to certain demonized and dehumanized
14
ethnic, political, religious, national, or racial groups. Conceptualizing war
criminals and génocidaires as deviants from fundamental societal norms may
make less sense where their criminal conduct, while deviant by reference to
international norms and general principles of law common to civilized nations,
nonetheless becomes in some sense normative within the criminal’s

11

E.g., Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT–94–1, Judgment, ¶ 191 (July 15, 1999) (“Most of the
time [ICL] crimes do not result from the criminal propensity of single individuals but constitute
manifestations of collective criminality: the crimes are often carried out by groups of individuals
acting in pursuance of a common criminal design.”); see also Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague,
Peace in the Former Yugoslavia? A Commentary on the United Nations War Crimes Tribunal, 20
HUM. RTS. Q. 737, 781 (1998) [hereinafter Akhavan, Justice in the Hague]; George P. Fletcher, The
Storrs Lectures: Liberals and Romantics at War: The Problem of Collective Guilt, 111 YALE L.J.
1499, 1514 (2002). For convenience, I will at times refer collectively to war crimes, crimes against
humanity, genocide, and aggression as “international crimes” or “ICL crimes.”
12
Danner, supra note 1, at 466; see Wisconsin v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476, 487–88 (1993)
(accepting the argument that a bias-crime statute “singles out for enhancement bias-inspired conduct
because this conduct is thought to inflict greater individual and societal harm,” for “bias-motivated
crimes are more likely to provoke retaliatory crimes, inflict distinct emotional harms on their victims,
and incite community unrest”).
13
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1512, 1538.
14
W. Michael Reisman, Legal Responses to Genocide and Other Massive Violations of Human
Rights, 59 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 75, 77 (1996).
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15

community, be it national, ethnic, racial, or martial.
These observations do not necessarily impugn ICL’s coherence or
viability as a criminal justice system, but they undoubtedly call for far greater
attention to the features that distinguish it. The process of adjudication,
however, is an awkward stage at which to recognize and accommodate the
salient distinctions. Efforts to modify the ICL trial process itself would be
likely to raise questions about fundamental fairness to the defendants and to
conflict with due process standards guaranteed by international human rights
law. It would be ironic and counterproductive were ICL trials to undermine
16
some international human rights standards in an effort to vindicate others.
Sentencing, by contrast, tends to be a far more flexible process; it can more
readily be tailored to accommodate the factors relevant to appraising
culpability in contexts that often differ dramatically from those presumed by
national criminal justice systems. Many issues highlighted by critiques of the
national law analogy might thereby be addressed without undermining the
integrity and relative uniformity of international due process standards.
This Article offers and defends an expressive account of punishment
by international criminal tribunals, which aims to maximize its efficacy while
responding to issues of justice, due process, and proportionality raised by a
closer examination of the flaws in the analogy between national and
international criminal justice. I argue that the expressive dimensions of
punishment best capture both the nature of international sentencing and its
realistic institutional capacity to make a difference given the legal, political,
and resource constraints that will continue, for the foreseeable future, to afflict
international criminal tribunals. Expressive accounts of punishment emphasize
that incarceration and other forms of “hard treatment” do not impose suffering
only, or even primarily, as a means to deter crime or to exact a debt owed by
the criminal to society. Rather,
punishment is a conventional device for the expression of
attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of
disapproval and reprobation, on the part either of the
punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the
punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic
17
significance largely missing from other kinds of penalties.
15

See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 294–95; Drumbl, supra note 4, at 549–50, 567–68; Mark Osiel,
The Banality of Good: Aligning Incentives Against Mass Atrocity, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1751, 1755 &
nn.13–15, 1769 (2005); Tallgren, supra note 3, at 573–75.
16
See William A. Schabas, Sentencing by International Tribunals: A Human Rights Approach, 7
DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 461, 516 (1997) [hereinafter Schabas, A Human Rights Approach]; cf. Jan
Christoph Nemitz & Steffen Wirth, Some Observations on the Law on Sentencing of the ICC, 13 INT’L
CRIM. CT. MONITOR, Dec. 1999, at 13 (emphasizing that the International Criminal Court (ICC) “must
not only pronounce . . . principles of legal conduct but must also itself serve as an example of such
legal behaviour,” and that “[f]or this reason, a just and consistent sentencing practice is paramount: the
slightest hint of bias, or suspicion that the Court might have passed an unjust or disproportionate
judgment, could severely affect this . . . most important aim”).
17
JOEL FEINBERG, The Expressive Function of Punishment, in DOING AND DESERVING 95, 98
(1970); see also Dan M. Kahan, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 591, 599
(1996) (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention that
signifies moral condemnation.”).
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ICL’s ability to contribute to the lofty objectives ascribed to it depends
far more on enhancing its value as authoritative expression than on ill-fated
efforts to identify the “right” punishment, whatever that could mean, for often
18
unconscionable crimes.
In Part I, while recognizing the force of the critique of the national law
analogy, I offer some critiques of that critique and attempt to put it into
perspective. I emphasize that ICL must be conceived not as a panacea but as
one element of what should be a more comprehensive strategy to prevent and
address the circumstances that give rise to serious human rights atrocities. I
consider briefly some of the global challenges to ICL. My principal concern,
however, is not to appraise ICL’s value against other transitional justice
mechanisms. With the advent of the International Criminal Court (ICC), the
proliferation of hybrid tribunals, and the increasing invocation of universal
jurisdiction to try ICL crimes, I assume, at least for the purposes of this Article,
that ICL has become a fixture of the international legal landscape that will
continue to evolve rapidly. My hope is to clarify more precisely the objectives
that ICL might realistically further and to consider how greater attention to
punishment—the distinctive feature of any system of criminal law—and its
manifestation in the ICL sentencing process might enhance the ability of ICL
to contribute to them.
In Part II, I analyze three significant ways in which ICL differs from
national criminal justice, focusing on the distinctive nature of the communities,
crimes, and perpetrators implicated by ICL generally and international
tribunals applying ICL in particular. I argue that, at least for purposes of
conceptualizing punishment and sentencing, these tribunals should not,
contrary to the prevailing view, be conceived as institutions designed to
dispense proxy justice—that is, as substitutes for national criminal justice
systems disabled by a lack of political will or resources. I also explore whether
and to what extent the collective and psychological pathologies manifest in
ICL crimes should bear on their punishment.
In Part III, I briefly trace the transition in ICL penal jurisprudence
from a relatively crude retributive impulse, exemplified by the post-World War
II trials of the Axis war criminals, to the increasingly complex, but largely
haphazard, approach manifest in the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The idea of applying the unwieldy machinery
of a newly designed international criminal justice system to the Axis war
criminals, which today strikes many as relatively uncontroversial, emerged as
an alternative to the proposal, espoused by Winston Churchill and others, that
they be summarily executed. In part for that reason, the postwar architects of
ICL gave little thought to the propriety or justification of ICL punishment.
Until the recent proliferation of ICL, the product of post-Cold War human
rights crises in the Balkans, Rwanda, East Timor, and elsewhere, it would have
19
been impossible to speak of an ICL sentencing jurisprudence. Convicted war
18

BASS, supra note 3, at 13 (“There is no such thing as appropriate punishment for the
massacres at Srebrenica or Djakovica; only the depth of our legalist ideology makes it seem so.”).
Bass also quotes a well-known letter from Hannah Arendt to Karl Jaspers in which she remarks that
“[i]t may well be essential to hang Göring, but it is totally inadequate. That is, this guilt, in contrast to
all criminal guilt, oversteps and shatters any and all legal systems.” Id.
19
The absence of a sentencing jurisprudence does not necessarily distinguish ICL. In the United
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criminals, absent substantial mitigation, were killed. By the 1990s, however,
international human rights law, which embraces the rehabilitative ideal but at
the same time insists on a “just deserts” concept of proportionality in
sentencing, had evolved so as to render it intolerable to continue to sentence all
convicted ICL criminals to death—particularly given the aspiration of the
international human rights movement to abolish capital punishment altogether.
The judgments of the ad hoc tribunals now offer some tentative guidance on
sentencing, but the jurisprudence has not, by and large, grappled with the
difficult moral, legal, and practical questions raised by the ways in which ICL
differs profoundly from national criminal justice. Resource constraints, which
led the ad hoc tribunals to abandon distinct sentencing hearings at an early
stage, also impeded the growth of a sentencing jurisprudence.
In Part IV, I argue that the expressive capacity of punishment best
accommodates the confluence of ICL and international human rights law. I
analyze the extent to which the standard justifications for punishment in
national criminal law can or should be transposed to the distinct legal, moral,
and institutional context of ICL. Each conventional account of punishment
offers some insights that should be integrated into a comprehensive account of
ICL’s penal goals, but the highly distinct nature of ICL relative to national
criminal justice compromises the coherence or efficacy (or both) of
conventional crime control (deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation) and
retributive justifications for punishment. The principal value of ICL
punishment lies in its expressive dimensions, which more accurately capture
the nature of international sentencing and ICL’s realistic institutional capacity
to contribute to the ambitious objectives ascribed to it. International criminal
tribunals can contribute most effectively to world public order as selfconsciously expressive penal institutions: publicly condemning acts deplored
by international law, acting as an engine of jurisprudential development at the
local level, and encouraging the legal and normative internalization of
international human rights and humanitarian law. At the same time,
international human rights law requires that the deterrent or retributive goals to
which a focus on the expressive capacity of punishment may contribute be
tempered and constrained by considerations of due process, rehabilitation,
proportionality, and justice.
I conclude by briefly considering what practical guidance this account
of ICL punishment offers for the substantive law and process of sentencing by
international criminal tribunals.
In particular, it counsels first, the
institutionalization of sentencing hearings as a vital component of ICL trials;
second, greater attention to context and the role of the defendant vis-à-vis any
implicated collective entities (states, armies, tribes, and so forth) as relevant
aggravating or mitigating circumstances and a jurisprudence that distinguishes
rank-and-file perpetrators from the architects and orchestrators of ICL crimes
(and those on the spectrum between these poles); and finally, efforts to
increase the level and quality of jurisprudential exchange between international
and national criminal justice institutions—for the efficacy of international
States, for example, until the latter half of the twentieth-century, it would have been difficult to speak
of a federal sentencing jurisprudence. KATE STITH & JOSÉ A. CABRANES, FEAR OF JUDGING:
SENTENCING GUIDELINES AND THE FEDERAL COURTS 23 (1993).
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criminal tribunals ultimately depends on their ability to contribute to the
20
development and enforcement of ICL “at the local level, where all of us live.”
I stress that ICL, properly conceived, means more than international
criminal tribunals, the focus of this Article; it includes the synergistic efforts of
national and hybrid courts applying ICL, experiments with universal
jurisdiction, and transitional justice mechanisms including truth commissions
and lustration. I do not intend the account of ICL punishment and sentencing
offered here as a universal answer to the sentencing issues faced by local and
hybrid courts, some of which undoubtedly differ in degree and kind. It may,
however, provide guidance, for the international goals of ICL sentencing
should always, in my judgment, be factored into determinations of just
punishment for ICL crimes.
I. ICL IN PERSPECTIVE: EXPECTATIONS AND STRATEGIES
Immi Tallgren rightly asks why “it generally seems to be taken for
granted that whatever objectives and justifications work—or are supposed to
work—on the national level should also, without any extra effort, cover the
21
decisions and actions taken by states in concert.” Efforts to transpose general
principles of criminal law common to many national legal systems to the
substantially distinct moral, legal, and institutional setting of ICL may be
misguided. Part of the problem, however, which I want to emphasize at the
outset, lies in the overzealousness of some proponents, which creates unduly
high expectations about what ICL can or should manage to accomplish. The
ambitious goals ascribed to ICL include combating impunity, individuating
guilt, promoting accountability, contributing to the reestablishment of
international peace and security, deterring future atrocities, achieving
retribution, creating an accurate historical record, and fostering both national
22
and international reconciliation. But it should go without saying that ICL can
only be expected to augment, not substitute for, other strategies—diplomatic,
economic, military, and developmental—to address serious human rights
23
crises.
Prospectively, international law must focus far more than it has in the
past on developing and implementing prophylactic strategies to prevent largescale human rights atrocities in the first place. Where those strategies fail,
24
military intervention must, I believe, remain an option. Retrospectively,
international law should certainly combat a culture of impunity for human
rights violations. But overemphasis on the ICL paradigm to the exclusion of
20

Alvarez, supra note 1, at 483.
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 565–66; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 542–44, 566–67.
22
See, e.g., Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943,
1961 (2001); Nemitz & Wirth, supra note 16, at 13.
23
Cf. Payam Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 740 (“Nor is it befitting to
subscribe to the judicial romanticism in some circles that views the ICTY as a panacea for all the ills
of the former Yugoslavia.”).
24
For thoughtful discussions, see MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, Human Rights as Politics, in HUMAN
RIGHTS AS POLITICS AND IDOLATRY 37–48 (2001); MICHAEL WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in
ARGUING ABOUT WAR 67–81 (2004).
21
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alternative accountability mechanisms, such as lustration in the eastern
European states of the former Soviet bloc or South Africa’s innovative Truth
and Reconciliation Commission, would be misguided and probably
25
counterproductive. ICL remains only one tool, and by no means always the
most appropriate or efficacious one, for addressing the diverse circumstances
that give rise to large-scale human rights atrocities and violations of the laws of
26
war. Even if international law now creates a duty to prosecute under some
27
circumstances, it surely does not prohibit complementary mechanisms for
confronting the daunting political, social, and legal issues that face states
emerging from internal strife, civil war, genocide, repressive regimes, and
other circumstances in which widespread ICL violations characteristically
occur.
Tragically, however, states historically fail to mobilize the political
will to act to prevent or forestall mass atrocities until they reach horrific
28
proportions—and often not even then.
The North Atlantic Treaty
Organization’s military intervention in Kosovo represented an encouraging, if
controversial, precedent. Yet in retrospect, in the post-9/11 world and in view
of the deplorable failure to take decisive action in Darfur, Kosovo appears to
represent an exception enabled by a unique combination of circumstances
rather than to herald a new era of multilateral interventions to prevent largescale human rights atrocities. By contrast, since the end of the Cold War,
states have shown both political will and enthusiasm for ICL prosecutions.
With the advent of the ICC and the increasingly frequent invocation of
29
universal jurisdiction by national courts, ICL will probably continue to evolve
rapidly at both the national and international levels.
We should continue to debate the merits (and demerits) of ICL as an
international legal response to large-scale human rights atrocities, particularly
because, insofar as undue attention to or reliance on ICL distracts from
prophylactic strategies or excuses failures to take prompt action in the face of
30
imminent crises, it emerges as no more than “cynical theater.” There is more
than a little truth to the critique that international prosecutions in the wake of
mass atrocities operate as a “fig leaf” to cloak and ameliorate the collective
guilt of states and world leaders for their failure to intervene earlier or more

25

See James J. Silk, International Criminal Justice and the Protection of Human Rights: The Rule
of Law or the Hubris of Law? (Feb. 28, 2006) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author)
(critiquing overemphasis on the prosecutorial model of international human rights protection).
26
Reisman, supra note 14, at 79; see also The Secretary-General, Report of the SecretaryGeneral, The Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Situations, ¶ 1, U.N.
Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23, 2004) (emphasizing the need “to eschew one-size-fits-all formulas”).
27
See Diane Orenlichter, Settling Accounts: The Duty to Prosecute Human Rights Violations of a
Prior Regime, 100 YALE L.J. 2537 (1991); see also Ronald C. Slye, The Legitimacy of Amnesties
Under International Law and General Principles of Anglo-American Law: Is a Legitimate Amnesty
Possible?, 43 VA. J. INT’L L. 173, 182–91 (2001).
28
See SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL”: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE
(2002) (documenting and analyzing the reasons for the persistent failure of the United States to act to
prevent or forestall genocide).
29
See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL
PERSPECTIVES 1 (2003); Anthony J. Colangelo, The New Universal Jurisdiction: In Absentia
Signaling Over Clearly Defined Crimes, 36 GEO. J. INT’L L. 537 (2005).
30
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 745.
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31

decisively. ICL’s rapid development in the 1990s can be traced in part to the
shameful failure of states to muster the collective political will to prevent or
forestall systematic human rights atrocities, most notably in the Balkans and
Rwanda. This may account for some of the unrealistic expectations about its
short-term potential to achieve objectives like the reconciliation of states torn
by ethnic conflict or genocide, or the restoration of international peace and
security in a region.
But the origin of a practice neither defines its fixed purpose nor limits
its potential utility. And realistically, retrospective prosecutions may at times
be the only international legal response practically available given the
constraints of international politics. In view of ICL’s resilience and
development, we should, I think, acknowledge that for better or worse, states
have made a decision to devote considerable resources—intellectual,
economic, diplomatic, and otherwise—to establishing an international criminal
justice system for war crimes and human rights atrocities, at the heart of which
lies the nascent ICC. Not as apologists but as realists, the relevant question
then becomes not how ICL measures up against theoretically better or arguably
more effective, but practically unavailable, international strategies, but rather,
what goals can and should ICL realistically serve? How can we increase its
efficacy and legitimacy?
We must also bear in mind that just as national criminal prosecutions
represent only one component of a state’s overall policy to control crime,
which may include, in addition, policing strategies, social programs, education,
economic development, and so forth, so international criminal prosecutions
should be—and should be expected to be—only one component of a broader
strategy toward international human rights atrocities. Tallgren, who offers a
thoughtful critique of ICL based on flaws in the national law analogy,
nonetheless recognizes that the critique itself relies on a somewhat unfair
analogy: “The ‘international criminal justice system’ is assumed to function
following the mechanisms of an idealized national system that cannot be
32
localized anywhere.”
These qualifications aside, critiques of the analogy to national criminal
justice raise many legitimate concerns. Foremost among them are issues raised
by the nature and priority of the diverse community interests implicated by
ICL; the corporate character of ICL crimes; and the often dramatically distinct
sociopolitical context in which violations of ICL characteristically occur.
II. AN APPRAISAL OF THE NATIONAL LAW ANALOGY
A. Nature of the Community: Proxy Justice, Global Stability, and Global
Humanity
Systems of criminal law presuppose their value to one or more

31

Id. at 744–45 (discussing the skepticism and cynicism with which some greeted the
establishment of the ICTY).
32
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 566–67.
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communities, in the case of a national criminal justice system, to the
community of that state’s citizens. The imprimatur of a community
34
distinguishes the unauthorized infliction of suffering from lawful punishment.
Punishment, in turn, is justified by its value to a community. Theories of
punishment necessarily invoke the interests and values of the community that
prescribes it to justify, by reference to its consequences or some perceived
moral imperative, the legally sanctioned infliction of suffering. Deterrence,
like incapacitation, seeks to protect the community from crime, whether by the
same person or future putative criminals; rehabilitation strives to reform the
criminal to promote his productive reintegration into the community; and
retribution, unlike vengeance, is understood to vindicate certain communal
norms and interests.
Punishment in national legal systems, for all its complexity, can be
appraised in terms of the objectives of a single community or polity. Which
communal interests ICL purports to serve is less clear. At times, we speak of
ICL in terms of interests and values comparable to those identified with
national criminal justice—for example, the rights and retributive interests of
literal victims defined, typically, by nationality, religion, or ethnicity. In this
regard, ICL emerges as a system of proxy justice for disenfranchised local
communities victimized by widespread human rights atrocities. At other
times, we emphasize the interests and values of the figurative international
community, either as a community of states or in terms of the more elusive,
somewhat mystical, notion of a community of mankind, a civitas maxima. To
appraise punishment in the ICL context, we need to ask in the first place which
community, literal or figurative, ICL should deem its principal referent, for the
35
interests of different communities not infrequently conflict.
To cite one well-known example of the tensions this can introduce:
The International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR) has struggled, with
very limited success, to strike the proper balance between the interests of the
states that established it through concerted international action—states that
maintain strong commitments to emerging international human rights norms—
and the retributive penal interests of Rwanda and its nationals. The latter
objected vociferously, for example, to the Security Council’s decision not to

33

4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 5 (Univ. of Chicago
Press 2002) (1769) (stating that criminal law concerns “the whole community, considered as a
community, in it’s [sic] social aggregate capacity”).
34
In terms of Hart’s well-known enumeration of the elements of punishment, punishment “must
be imposed and administered by an authority constituted by a legal system against which the offence
is committed.” H.L.A. HART, Prolegomenon to the Principles of Punishment, in PUNISHMENT AND
RESPONSIBILITY: ESSAYS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 1, 5 (1968); see also Greenawalt, supra note 6,
at 343–46.
35
See, e.g., Mahnoush H. Arsanjani & W. Michael Reisman, The Law-in-Action of the
International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 385, 393 n.35 (2005) (citing a report by the Refugee
Law Project of Makerere University, which criticizes referral of the crisis in northern Uganda to the
ICC as undermining “the legitimacy of the ICC at the grassroots level” because of “the disjuncture
between international conceptions of justice and local community traditions, values, and notions of
justice”); cf. Osiel, supra note 15, at 1756 (“No one who attends transitional justice conferences in
postconflict societies can long fail to notice the near total disconnect between the discourse of local
participants, often focused on historically specific grievances about who did what horrible thing to
whom, and of we more ‘cosmopolitan,’ peripatetic academic consultants, touting larger lessons drawn
from other countries recently facing similar predicaments.”).
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36

authorize capital punishment in the ICTR Statute, and to the ICTR’s decision,
since retracted, to release Jean-Bosco Barayagwiza, a notorious génocidaire,
37
because of the prosecution’s alleged violation of his due process rights.
Incidents like these highlight the not-infrequent tension between the interests
of the figurative international community and those of the literal (local or
38
national) communities that ICL also ostensibly serves. International penal
interests may, and hopefully will, overlap to some degree with those of the
affected local communities. Still, instances of conflict, as in Rwanda, remain
39
inevitable.
The prevailing paradigm for ICL conceives of it “as a means of filling
40
in for national justice,” that is, as proxy justice pursued by international
institutions and actors on behalf of local communities victimized by
international crimes. This view finds support in several comparatively recent
developments in ICL. For purposes of sentencing, for example, the statutes of
the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the
ICTR include a renvoi to the national law and practice of the former
41
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively. Arguably, this implies a conception of
the ad hoc tribunals as institutions designed to substitute for disabled national
systems. In fact, we know that the drafters included these references to the
general practice of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda out of a conservative
regard for the principle of legality, nullum crimen sine lege, nulla poena sine
42
lege. The ad hoc tribunals do not, in any event, consider themselves bound
43
by the penal practices of these states.
A far more compelling argument for the proxy-justice model of
36

The Statute of the ICTR limits punishment to imprisonment. ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art.
23(1). Rwandan law authorizes the death penalty. Because the ICTR enjoys jurisdictional primacy
over Rwandan courts, id., art. 8(2), and has sought to prosecute the most culpable offenders, as a
practical matter, the leaders, orchestrators, and architects of the genocide will not face the death
penalty, while rank-and-file perpetrators, who have been relegated to Rwanda’s local courts, will. This
anomaly, among other factors, led Rwanda to vote against the Security Council resolution establishing
the ICTR. See Akhavan, Politics and Pragmatics, supra note 2, at 507–08.
37
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Request for Review or
Reconsideration, Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72, ¶¶ 71, 74 (Mar. 31, 2000); Barayagwiza v Prosecutor,
Case No. ICTR-97-19-AR72 (Nov. 3, 1999). For analysis, see William A. Schabas, Case Report:
Barayagwiza v. Prosecutor, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 563 (2000).
38
See Jenia Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN. J. INT’L L. 1, 25–26
(2005).
39
Surely, for example, survivors of a future genocide may find it difficult to understand why the
Rome Statute not only excludes capital punishment but also generally limits terms of incarceration to
thirty years. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 77.
40
Ruti Teitel, Book Note, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 872, 874 (2004) (reviewing POST-CONFLICT
JUSTICE (M. Cherif Bassiouni ed., 2002)); see also Steven Glickman, Victims’ Justice: Legitimizing
the Sentencing Regime of the International Criminal Court, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 229, 257
(2004) (describing the ICC’s purpose as “to supplant (at least temporarily) defunct domestic criminal
justice systems”).
41
ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 24(1) (instructing trial chambers to consider “the general
practice regarding prison sentences in the courts of the former Yugoslavia”); ICTR Statute, supra note
4, art. 23(1) (instructing the trial chambers to “have recourse to the general practice regarding prison
sentences in the courts of Rwanda”).
42
Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 468–69, 482.
43
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, Sentencing Judgment ¶ 40 (Nov. 29,
1996); see also Stuart Beresford, Unshackling the Paper Tiger—The Sentencing Practices of the Ad
Hoc International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, 1 INT’L CRIM. L. REV.
33, 48–49 (2001).
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international criminal tribunals proceeds from the lauded principle of
complementarity. To many, this principle, which conditions the admissibility
of a case brought to the ICC on the characterization of the relevant state as
44
“unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution,”
implies that the ICC acts as a substitute for national criminal justice systems
disabled by a lack of political will or resources. In a technical sense, this may
45
be true, but it is also misleading. For a number of closely related reasons,
international criminal tribunals do not, and as a practical matter, probably
46
cannot offer proxy justice to the victims of serious human rights atrocities.
Given their limited resources, international tribunals will never be able
to prosecute more than a tiny fraction of the perpetrators of crimes that
47
implicate hundreds, if not thousands. The subset selected for prosecution has
historically been, and will inevitably remain, contingent on discretionary
48
Of
political decisions made by international rather than local officials.
course, international lawyers increasingly agree that both practical and moral
reasons counsel a strong, if not exclusive, focus on the leaders, orchestrators,
and architects with the greatest responsibility for the crimes rather than the
49
rank and file; in a recent policy statement, the Prosecutor of the ICC
50
But it will not always conform to the
expressly adopted this strategy.
priorities of the victims, many of whom would naturally want to see the direct
perpetrators of crimes affecting them or their kin punished. Their penal
interests, understandably, will likely be more emotively retributive than those
of a figurative international community invested in more abstract, long-term
44

Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 17. See Ruth B. Phillips, The International Criminal Court
Statute: Jurisdiction and Admissibility, 10 CRIM. L.F. 61, 77 (1999).
45
But see Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 35, at 391–97 (observing that the first investigation
by the Prosecutor of the ICC arose from a voluntary referral by the implicated state, Uganda, even
though its courts cannot, at least in the sense intended by the drafters of the Rome Statute, be
characterized as “unwilling or unable genuinely” to investigate and prosecute crimes arising out of the
conflict between the Ugandan government and the rebel Lord’s Resistance Army).
46
See Alvarez, supra note 1, at 403.
47
The Secretary General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional
Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 46, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 2004); Akhavan,
Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 775.
48
See MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN VENGEANCE & FORGIVENESS 30–31, 38–40 (1998); Diane
Marie Amann, Group Mentality, Expressivism, and Genocide, 2 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 93, 116 (2002).
The highly political nature of ICL prosecutions—that only some serious international atrocities (and
only some of the perpetrators of those atrocities) have been or will be prosecuted because of the
realities of international power and politics—is a valid objection as far as it goes to the international
criminal justice system as a whole. See id. at 116 (“A random confluence of political concerns
produced ad hoc tribunals for just two out of a number of conflicts that warranted such treatment.”);
see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 581. But given that the system exists, efforts to bring greater
coherence, justice, and due process to its operation remain valuable nonetheless, and in the long term,
may render the political selectivity of the system less tolerable to its constituents. I am grateful to
Thomas Pogge for an enlightening exchange on this issue.
49
E.g., U.N. General Assembly Official Records [GAOR], Second Annual Report of the
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991,
¶ 31, U.N. Doc. A/50/365, S/1995/728 (Aug. 23, 1995); Carla Del Ponte, Prosecuting the Individuals
Bearing the Highest Level of Responsibility, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 516 (2004). But see Alvarez, supra
note 1, at 458 (challenging the assumption that elites necessarily deserve more severe punishments
than low-level perpetrators directly responsible for crimes of brutal violence).
50
ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor
7 (Sept. 2003), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030905_Policy_Paper.pdf
[hereinafter Policy Paper].
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goals: ending the culture of impunity for human rights violators, contributing
to the reestablishment of international peace and security, promoting the global
51
rule of law, and so forth.
Experience with the ad hoc tribunals also
consistently shows that local communities implicated by their work perceive
52
them as distant, foreign, alien, and often illegitimate.
Steps can and should be taken to improve the responsiveness of
international tribunals to local needs and priorities. Trials, for example, might
53
be held, where possible, in the state where the atrocities took place. At their
core, however, the problems identified above can only be reduced, not
eliminated. They inhere in the nature and constitution of international criminal
tribunals, with judicial and prosecutorial personnel, structures, statutes, and
mandates established by states acting in diplomatic fora rather than by national
leaders acting in national fora. With respect to the ICC, for example, its
54
Prosecutor and judges, directly, and the assembly of states parties,
architecturally, not any particular local community, determine the priority and
55
propriety of bringing particular cases.
These actors will exercise their
discretion with foremost reference to the international interests they
56
represent. The ICC may be able to bolster local efforts at national justice and
improve its solicitude for the victims, but it neither can nor should radically
restructure itself in response to the highly divergent local circumstances and
57
legal, political, and social cultures implicated by each situation referred to it.
51

Alvarez, supra note 1, at 406 & n.207, 454 n.450; see also José E. Alvarez, Rush to Closure:
Lessons of the Tadić Judgment, 96 MICH. L. REV. 2031, 2092 (1998) (“Some might contend that
victims and survivors would derive more satisfaction from participation in trials leading to convictions
of their actual torturers and rapists; that both groups might find greater catharsis from seeing such
persons in the dock than from seeing their commanders—usually strangers to those victimized—who
gave impersonal orders or encouraged such crimes generally.”).
52
Turner, supra note 38, at 24–25.
53
The seat of the ICC is in The Hague, but trials may be held elsewhere by agreement. Rome
Statute, supra note 4, art. 3.
54
See Rome Statute, supra note 4, arts. 17–19. Note, in particular, that the Court may, in its
discretion, find a case inadmissible on the ground that it “is not of sufficient gravity to justify further
action by the Court.” Id. art. 17(d).
55
The priorities of these actors cannot, of course, be equated simply with any monolithic
international community. Because the ICC will frequently operate “in the midst of the conflict” rather
than “after the acute and violent situation in which the alleged crimes occurred has been resolved by
military victory or political settlement,” Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 35, at 385 (emphasis
added), it may well generate conflict both within different sectors of the international community (for
example, between political and judicial priorities), as well as between the international community and
implicated local communities.
56
In the context of Rwanda, for example, the existence of the ICTR has undoubtedly privileged
international goals “over the desires of many of those who have been most immediately affected by
the genocide.” Alvarez, supra note 1, at 409–10. The ICC does not enjoy the jurisdictional primacy
criticized by Alvarez. Yet once the Court takes jurisdiction of a case, it seems unrealistic to expect
that the manifold international pressures on the Prosecutor and Court will not result in a similar
pattern, for “international tribunals are accountable to, and respond most readily to, international
lawyers’ jurisprudential and other agendas and only incidentally to the needs of victims of mass
atrocity.” Id. at 410. I do not mean to suggest that the ICC, or any other international criminal
tribunal, should neglect the interests of local communities harmed by the ICL violations, nor that the
Prosecutor will not cooperate with national authorities both to accommodate (to some degree) the
latter’s penal interests and to maximize the efficiency of international justice. The Court has already
worked with local authorities in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and Uganda, the sites of the
first two situations it decided to investigate. See Hans-Peter Kaul, Construction Site for More Justice:
The International Criminal Court After Two Years, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 370 (2005).
57
Hybrid courts, which employ a mixture of national and international or foreign laws,
procedures, and personnel, are analytically distinct. They serve to bolster—at the financial, legal, and
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Complementarity recognizes (correctly, in my judgment) that national
prosecutions, if genuine, feasible, and fair, more effectively serve the manifold
58
goals ascribed to ICL than do international prosecutions.
Principal
responsibility for controlling, judging, and punishing the conduct of
individuals during times of war and other serious widespread violence must
remain in the first instance on the highly organized, and often well-disciplined,
collective entities—states, armies, and their cognates—implicated. ICL, in this
regard, benefits from and indeed relies on the “dual positivization” of its legal
59
Despite the vilification of the state in ICL discourse, we should
norms.
always bear in mind, as Michael Ignatieff emphasizes in the context of
international human rights enforcement, that the best guarantor of compliance
with the laws of war and other ICL norms is not international law and
60
institutions; it is a functioning state.
But it does not follow that once an international tribunal assumes
jurisdiction, it should conceive of itself or strive to function as a proxy for local
interests. As a matter of functional capacity, it is doubtful that it can; as a
matter of democratic legitimacy, it is unclear how it could. The avowed
mission of international criminal tribunals, historically and today, is to
prosecute “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community
61
as a whole.” The drafters of the Rome Statute did not design the Court with a
view to the satisfaction of local penal interests. Nor is the Court intended to
replicate the process to which a defendant would be subject under an able and
willing system of national criminal law. With regard to sentencing, the
drafters deliberately omitted any reference to national penal law and practice in
the interest of “equality of justice through a uniform penalties regime for all
62
persons convicted by the Court.”
International criminal tribunals, unlike national courts, derive their
authority from the concerted action of states, acting either pursuant to
multilateral treaties (the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German
Major War Criminals (IMT) and the ICC) or under the authority of Chapter
normative levels—the capacity and legitimacy of national courts, but they do not function as
institutions structured principally to serve international penal interests. See Laura A. Dickinson, The
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003).
58
See Alvarez, supra note 1, at 459–62; see also Turner, supra note 38.
59
See Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House, 105
COLUM. L. REV. 1681, 1747 (2005) (“International law operates and can be enforced to a certain
extent on its account and through its own institutions and agencies. But particularly in human rights
law and humanitarian law, international covenants and conventions operate best when they are
matched by parallel provisions of national constitutions and legislation.”) (quoting Gerald L. Neuman,
Human Rights and Constitutional Rights: Harmony and Dissonance, 55 STAN. L. REV. 1863, 1864
(2003)).
60
MICHAEL IGNATIEFF, WHOSE UNIVERSAL VALUES? THE CRISIS IN HUMAN RIGHTS 19 (1999).
61
Rome Statute, supra note 4, pmbl. (emphasis added); see also id., art. 5(1); id., art. 1 (vesting
the Court with jurisdiction over “the most serious crimes of international concern”) (emphasis added).
The International Military Tribunal (IMT) at Nuremberg characterized the Axis crimes not as offenses
against a particular ethnic or national group (for example, the Jews or the French), but against the
international community. Similar pronouncements appeared in the Treaty of Versailles, which framed
Kaiser Wilhelm II’s indictment in terms of the deliberately ambiguous rubric of “a supreme offence
against international morality and the sanctity of treaties.” Treaty of Peace Between the Allied and
Associated Powers and Germany, art. 227, June 28, 1919, 226 Consol. T.S. 188, 285.
62
Rolf Einar Fife, Article 77: Applicable Penalties, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 985, 986 (Otto Triffterer ed. 1999).
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VII of the U.N. Charter, itself a multilateral treaty (the ad hoc tribunals for the
former Yugoslavia and Rwanda). The Hobbesian notion of an implicit social
contract—whereby individuals surrender certain rights to the state, which then
gets a monopoly on legitimate coercion, in exchange for a measure of
security—is strained in this context. And the concept of an international
community is notoriously problematic and ambiguous. Unlike national
communities, comprised of persons bound together by, at a minimum,
territory, and, more often than not, by features such as values, language,
culture, laws, history, and social norms, the international community defies a
monolithic definition. Often, it functions as no more than a convenient
shorthand for a broad array of global actors (including but not limited to
63
states), processes, values, and interests.
To develop a fair, principled, and consistent regime for international
sentencing, however, we should nonetheless take seriously the project of
identifying penal interests that reflect what we generally mean by an
international community in the ICL context. A crime may be “of concern to
the international community as a whole” because it threatens either state
interests (the focus of traditional, Westphalian international law) or certain
paramount values of mankind (a concept redolent of natural law and identified
with the modern international human rights movement). To say that
international criminal tribunals punish “the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole” implies the latter meaning. The
former, by contrast, generally calls to mind “transnational” crimes that can
more effectively be investigated, prevented, or prosecuted through
international regimes of cooperation, including treaties proscribing certain
substantive conduct and extradition and other treaties facilitating procedural
64
cooperation.
In fact, ICL implicates both the shared values of humanity and the
shared interests of states to varying degrees. Aggression, for example, leaving
63

E.g., Dickinson, supra note 57, at 303 (emphasizing that “there is never one, monolithic
international community,” but rather “multiple international constituencies: communities of nationstates (such as UN members, Security Council members, NATO countries, the Council of Europe, and
the Organization of American States), communities of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (such
as human rights NGOs, humanitarian NGOs, or development NGOs), or communities of other actors
such as corporations, academics, and on and on”); Michael D. Ramsey, International Materials and
Domestic Rights: Reflections on Atkins and Lawrence, 98 AM. J. INT’L L. 69, 79 (2004) (noting that
the “comfortable rhetoric” of an international community “disguises the fact that there is no unified
‘world community’ with a simple and easily accessible opinion to be had for the asking,” but “only
hundreds of societies, with diverse and conflicting national practices”).
64
Examples include narcotics trafficking, terrorism, transnational organized crime, and
interference with the mail or international submarine cables. See, e.g., United Nations Convention
Against Transnational Organized Crime, Nov. 15, 2000, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 108–16 (2004), G.A.
Res. 25, Annex I, U.N. GAOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/55/25 (2001); International Convention
for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, Jan. 10, 2000, G.A. Res. 109, U.N. GAOR, 54th
Sess., 76th mtg., U.N. Doc. A/RES/54/109 (2000), 39 I.L.M. 270 (2000); International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Res. 164, U.N. GAOR, 52d Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/52/164 (Jan. 9, 1998), 37 I.L.M. 249 (1998); Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic
Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, Dec. 20, 1988, 28 I.L.M. 493 (1989); Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105;
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971,
24 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Protection of Submarine Cables, Mar. 14, 1884,
24 Stat. 989, 11 MARTENS NOUVEAU RECUEIL (ser. 2) 281. Extradition treaties tend to be bilateral,
though regional multilateral treaties exist. E.g., European Convention on Extradition, Dec. 13, 1957,
359 U.N.T.S. 273.

54

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

43:39
65

aside the intractable debate about its definition for the moment, disrupts the
peaceful and stable international order that the U.N. Charter regime strives to
preserve, implicating the interests of the international community qua
community of states. It also poses a widespread threat to life and liberty, core
values of humanity and universal human rights, implicating the interests of the
international community qua community of mankind.
Equally, while
widespread or systematic human rights violations that qualify as war crimes or
crimes against humanity implicate primarily the international interests of
66
mankind, since the establishment of the ICTY, it has been recognized in
international law that violations of ICL on this scale also endanger the
international interests of states to the extent that they rise to the level of a threat
to international peace and security within the meaning of Article 39 of the U.N.
67
Charter. This, after all, was the authority invoked by the Security Council for
the establishment of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
68
Rwanda. In short, to adapt Michael Walzer’s terminology, ICL violations
69
may threaten both “global stability” and “global humanity.”
Giving primacy to transnational penal interests will inevitably cause
friction with certain local communities, as it has in the past, but from a moral,
institutional, and legal perspective, it more accurately and appropriately
captures the values that punishment by international tribunals can realistically
65

The Rome Statute includes aggression as a crime within the ICC’s jurisdiction subject to the
significant provisos that it must be defined satisfactorily and the conditions for its prosecution
specified. Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 5(1)(d), 5(2). A serious obstacle to defining aggression
under international law is the uncertain relationship between the Security Council’s political role in
determining the existence of a threat to international peace and security and a putative international
criminal tribunal’s legal role in determining guilt for the initiation of aggressive war. See Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, 290 (June 27)
(Schwebel, J., dissenting) (emphasizing that “while the Security Council is invested by the Charter
with the authority to determine the existence of an act of aggression, it does not act as a court in
making such a determination”; rather, “[i]t may arrive at a determination of aggression—or, as more
often is the case, fail to arrive at a determination of aggression—for political rather than legal
reasons”).
66
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A, ¶¶ 19, 28 (Nov. 29, 1996).
67
W. Michael Reisman, Haiti and the Validity of International Action, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 82, 83
& n.3 (1995).
68
S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994), 33 I.L.M.
1600 (1994) (establishing the ICTR); S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., Annex, U.N. Doc.
S/25704 (1993), 32 I.L.M. 1159 (1993) (establishing the ICTY); cf. Note of the President of the
Security Council, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3046th mtg. at 3, U.N. Doc. S/23500 (1992). The assertion
that widespread or systematic ICL violations can constitute a threat to international peace and security
sufficient to justify action by the Security Council under Chapter VII of the U.N. Charter, while
subject to skepticism in some quarters, cf. Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1-AR72, Decision on
Defence Motion for Interlocutory Appeal on Jurisdiction, ¶ 27 (Oct. 2, 1995), 35 I.L.M. 32, 42 (1996)
(rejecting jurisdictional challenge based on the argument “that the establishment of the International
Tribunal had neither promoted, nor was capable of promoting, international peace, as the current
situation in the former Yugoslavia demonstrates”), is not implausible. The collateral consequences of
large-scale human rights atrocities include “cross-border violence, substantial refugees flows, serious
regional instability, or appreciable harm to the nationals of another state.” Michael J. Matheson,
United Nations Governance of Post-Conflict Societies, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 76, 83 (2001); see also
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 740. Consider, for example, the aftermath of the
Rwandan genocide, which led thousands of Hutu génocidaires-cum-refugees to seek sanctuary in the
state then known as Zaire, ultimately precipitating the demise of the Mobutu regime and contributing
to, if not causing, what has been characterized as a virtual world war in central Africa. Is it
coincidental that one of the first situations being investigated by the ICC is in the same state, now
known as the Democratic Republic of Congo? For a recent example, see Lydia Polgreen, Refugee
Crisis Grows as Darfur War Crosses a Border, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 28, 2006, at A1.
69
WALZER, The Politics of Rescue, in ARGUING ABOUT WAR, supra note 24, at 74.
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serve. Just as national criminal law conceives of crime as an offense against
the state as a collective, not against the individual members of that collective
immediately harmed by it, so ICL may be conceived analogously as concerned
principally with the penal interests and values of the international community
70
as a collective, not local political and social orders. Rather than persist in the
futile and impracticable effort to make genuinely international criminal
tribunals mimic national courts by dispensing proxy justice, ICL should
candidly acknowledge that these tribunals serve distinct goals and
constituencies.
To avert misunderstanding, I stress that the jurisdiction of international
tribunals should, in my view, remain the exception; indeed, as the Prosecutor
of the ICC noted in a recent policy statement, “the absence of trials by the ICC,
as a consequence of the effective functioning of national systems, would be a
71
major success.” Where the jurisdiction of an international tribunal properly
lies, however, it is by reference principally to international penal interests that
an internally consistent, just, and principled sentencing scheme can be
developed. The sentencing practices of the ICC cannot differ dramatically
from case to case as a function of the national laws and practices of different
affected states; they should not, that is, require the Court to impose disparate
sentences for similar criminal conduct based on where the crimes took place or
the nationalities of the victims. Whatever may be said about disparity in ICL
sentencing more generally, that kind of disparity would raise grave doubts
72
Complementarity suggests that where state
about the ICC’s legitimacy.
authorities can and will genuinely investigate or prosecute, international penal
interests dissipate; where they cannot or will not, those interests become
paramount.
In short, the authority and legitimacy of international criminal
tribunals derive from and rely on international rather than local laws and
values. National criminal justice for ICL violations should remain the norm.
Hybrid courts offer a valuable alternative in situations in which the political
73
will, but not the capacity, to investigate and prosecute exists. But where an
international tribunal assumes jurisdiction, international rather than local penal
interests provide the more appropriate metric for evaluating the institution of
70

Victims, in both national criminal law and ICL, may be, and ideally should be, beneficiaries of
the criminal law. International tribunals should take steps to improve their solicitude for the victims
and to enhance their legitimacy in the eyes of local communities. But criminal law, national and
international alike, does not and should not function principally as a proxy for the victim’s desire for
talionic vengeance. This is not to suggest that ICL need not concern itself with the needs of victims; it
is only to say that the failure of ICL tribunals to respond perfectly to the desires of the community
victimized by ICL and the related tensions that inevitably result do not condemn the enterprise.
71
Policy Paper, supra note 50, at 4.
72
See Danner, supra note 1, at 441–42 & n.105. Disparity will almost certainly remain an issue
in a different sense: Under the ICC complementarity regime, whether a perpetrator faces national or
international justice, and therefore the sentence to which he may be exposed, may depend on a
variable unrelated to culpability, the ability and willingness of national authorities to prosecute. But in
that event, the penal interests at stake remain national in the first instance. The perpetrator cannot
complain if his sentence would have been lower under international law, any more than perpetrators of
national crimes can justly complain that the sentence they would have received in another state with
concurrent jurisdiction over the same crime would have been less severe.
73
See Dickinson, supra note 57, at 310. But see Arsanjani & Reisman, supra note 35, at 402
(noting that the hybrid courts for Sierra Leone and Cambodia, which were to be funded by voluntary
contributions, face severe funding problems that call into question the viability of this model).
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punishment and developing an internally consistent, fair, and principled law of
international sentencing.
B. Nature of the Crimes: Collectivity, Secondary Harms, and the Diffusion of
Culpability
The transnational nature of the interests implicated by ICL should
guide consideration of the goals to which any effort to develop principles of
international sentencing should be directed. But the nature of the crimes and
perpetrators—the moral circumstances in which they act and the collective
character of the offenses—circumscribes the manner in which those goals can
and should be pursued. ICL crimes share a collective or corporate character
that distinguishes them from the bulk of national crimes; they can accurately
74
be described, in some sense, as “collective” crimes. To appreciate precisely
how the collective nature of international crimes may bear on sentencing,
however, we need to distinguish between several different senses, for they
arguably cut in different directions vis-à-vis the primary sentencing metrics of
75
harm and culpability. In particular, international crimes can be described as
collective in at least three ways: They may involve to varying degrees (1)
collective perpetrators, (2) collective victims, and (3) a collective or corporate
mens rea.
1. Collective Perpetration
George Fletcher offers a compelling argument to the effect that all
76
international crimes necessarily involve a collective perpetrator, generally a
state, army, or similar authority. As a categorical claim, this view strikes me
77
as mistaken. But improbable counterexamples aside, it is surely correct that
in the vast majority of cases, international criminals act on behalf of or in
furtherance of a collective criminal project: waging aggressive war; destroying
an ethnic, national, racial or religious group; carrying out a widespread or
systematic attack against a civilian population or systematically violating the
74

Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 781; see also Osiel, supra note 15, at 1752 &
n.4 (2005); Drumbl, supra note 4, at 571; Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 605.
75
The Rome Statute says little about sentencing, see supra note 4, arts. 76–78, but broadly, it
adopts harm (“gravity of the crime”) and culpability (“individual circumstances of the convicted
person”) as the determinants of sentences. Id., at art. 78, ¶ 1.
76
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1514–25.
77
In my view, to use Fletcher’s examples, a lone soldier, acting without the explicit or tacit
approval of his superiors, who refuses quarter to enemy soldiers would be guilty of a war crime
despite the absence of collective authorization, see id. at 1521; and a Sinophobe in Connecticut who
kills the first two Chinese men he encounters, with intent to destroy the Chinese people at least in part,
would be technically guilty of genocide despite the idiosyncratic nature of his crime in context. Id. at
1523. The mens rea for genocide, unlike that for crimes against humanity, does not require knowledge
of “a widespread or systematic attack.” Cf. Prosecutor v. Ndindabahizi, Case No. ICTR-2001-71
¶ 471 (July 15, 2004) (killing of a single individual with the requisite intent constitutes genocide).
Equally, for war crimes (to use a current example), it seems clear that an American soldier in Iraq who
tortures a prisoner at Abu Ghraib is guilty of a violation of the Geneva Conventions whether he acts as
a “bad apple” or pursuant to an official policy promulgated at some level of the military or civilian
hierarchy.
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rights of protected persons under the Geneva Conventions. For sentencing
purposes, it suffices to accept that collective perpetration is, if not an
indispensable element of each ICL crime, an almost invariable feature of each
in practice.
2. Collective Victims
The second collective aspect of international crimes concerns the
nature of the victim. With respect to some crimes, the collective nature of the
victim is clear. To qualify as a crime against humanity, for example, one or
79
more enumerated bad acts must be directed “against any civilian population.”
Genocide, similarly, requires the specific “intent to destroy, in whole or in part,
80
a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such,” and the ad hoc
tribunals have emphasized that “the victim is the group itself, not merely the
81
individual,” indeed, that “[t]he individual is the personification of the
82
group.” Waging aggressive war, too, plainly involves a collective victim,
typically another polity.
War crimes, however, present a more complex analysis. The Geneva
Conventions require that the culpable act be perpetrated against a member of
one of the protected groups: civilians, soldiers rendered hors de combat, or
83
prisoners of war. Yet war crimes do not involve a group victim in the same
sense as crimes against humanity and genocide; they do not necessarily visit
secondary harms on members of the targeted group, whether a civilian
84
population or a national, ethnic, racial, or religious group. Rather, “[t]he
protected person requirement is better seen as a limitation on jurisdiction than
85
an element requiring any particular mens rea on the part of the defendant.”
As a practical matter, however, international tribunals have historically
prosecuted systematic rather than isolated war crimes. The Rome Statute
strongly reinforces this trend, vesting the Court with jurisdiction over war
crimes “in particular when committed as part of a plan or policy or as part of a
78

But see Danner, supra note 1, at 472 n.238 (stating that “war crimes may often be committed
by soldiers acting on their own rather than according to a larger policy,” and that “the chapeau of the
war crimes provisions in both Statutes [the ICTR and ICTY Statutes] require neither an illegal
collective action nor an act targeted at someone because of his affiliation with a group”).
79
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 7(1); see also ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 3; ICTY Statute,
supra note 4, art. 5.
80
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, art. 2, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277 [hereinafter Genocide Convention].
81
Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ¶ 410 (May 16, 2003); accord Prosecutor v.
Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR 96-3-I, Judgment, ¶ 60 (Dec. 6, 1999) (“[T]he victim of the crime of
genocide is the group itself and not the individual alone.”).
82
Prosecutor v. Nahimana, Barayagwiza and Ngeze, Case No. ICTR-99-52-T, ¶ 948 (Dec. 3,
2003).
83
Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armed
Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 3114; Geneva Convention for the
Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces
at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment
of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Geneva Convention Relative to
the Protection of Civilians in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287.
84
See Glickman, supra note 40, at 245–46.
85
Danner, supra note 1, at 472 n.238.
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86

3. Collective Mens Rea
International crimes also characteristically involve a collective or
corporate mental state, a consciousness of action on behalf of or in furtherance
of a collective project. Crimes against humanity require knowledge of a
87
“widespread or systematic attack directed against a civilian population.”
Genocide, while theoretically a crime that can be perpetrated by a single
person, as a practical matter almost always involves a shared specific “intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as
88
such.”
Aggression (conceptually) and war crimes (characteristically)
likewise involve consciousness of acting as part of a group—for example, a
state, military unit or paramilitary organization—engaged in a common effort.
Legal philosophers frequently invoke Rousseau’s distinction between
two different sorts of collective action or intention: statistical or aggregative,
89
on the one hand, and communal or associative, on the other. “Collective
action is communal,” Dworkin writes, “when it cannot be reduced just to some
statistical function of individual action, when it presupposes a special, distinct,
collective agency. It is a matter of individuals acting together in a way that
merges their separate actions into a further, unified, act that is together
90
theirs.” International crimes implicate collective action and intention in this
associative, communal, or corporate sense. The collective mens rea of a
genocidal mob cannot be equated with the sum total of each individual
génocidaire’s mens rea. Rather, it is a shared, associative mens rea, a
consciousness of being part of a common project, of acting as a group.
Equally, waging war, obviously, is not a mere matter of each soldier engaging
in combat with the enemy; it involves highly disciplined coordination and a
91
chain of command.
4. Implications for Sentencing
These aspects of collectivity, which may be present to varying degrees
depending on the nature of the crime and the circumstances, arguably pull in
different directions with respect to culpability. Consider first the collective
nature of the victim. Several scholars and jurists, as well as the characteristic
rhetoric of international law, suggest that this feature aggravates culpability.
Danner, for example, advocating a view expressed by Judge Cassese in his

86

Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 8(1).
Id. art. 7(1).
88
Genocide Convention, supra note 80, art. 2. See Amann, supra note 48, at 93.
89
RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN
CONSTITUTION 19–20 (1996); Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1509–10 (citing JEAN-JACQUES ROUSSEAU,
THE SOCIAL CONTRACT (Maurice Cranson ed., St. Martin’s Press 1968) (1762)).
90
DWORKIN, supra note 89, at 20.
91
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1514–15.
87
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92

separate opinion in the Tadić sentencing appeal, offers a compelling case for
regarding, say, a murder committed as a crime against humanity or act of
genocide as more serious than the same act committed as a war crime, all other
factors bearing on culpability being held constant. Genocide and crimes
against humanity resemble bias crimes under national law and produce
93
comparable secondary harms that render the same act more culpable. From
this perspective, the collective nature of ICL crimes arguably enhances
culpability.
But the analogy to hate crimes, while offering important insights,
seems incomplete. A collective victim, a racial, national or ethnic group, for
example, characterizes hate crimes. But hate crimes do not necessarily evince
collective perpetration or what might be termed the cloak of collective
authority. To commit them, that is, individuals need not be associated with or
94
acting on behalf of some collective, state, or organizational policy or practice.
By contrast, for international crimes, the collective character and authority of
the perpetrator, as well as the associated corporate mens rea, in addition to the
collective nature of the victim, characterizes the culpable conduct. These
collective features of ICL crimes arguably diminish culpability insofar as they
diffuse moral responsibility and counsel distributing “guilt among the parties
to a criminal transaction,” mitigating each perpetrator’s guilt in some
95
proportion to that of the collective.
Again, however, the analysis remains incomplete, for these
observations apply differently depending on the defendant’s status and role
96
vis-à-vis the crimes, “the individual circumstances of the convicted person.”
On the one hand, the collective authority, power, and influence that enable
military and civilian elites to orchestrate a genocide, to instigate a widespread
or systematic attack against a civilian population, or to order, tacitly encourage
or simply tolerate (by failing to prevent or punish) war crimes seems to call for
97
a more severe penalty. The participation, instigation, encouragement, or even
92

Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-1, Judgment in Sentencing Appeals (Jan. 26, 2000)
(separate opinion of Cassese, J.). The jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals has engendered a debate
over whether, all other circumstances being held constant, a crime against humanity should be deemed
more serious than war crime, or an act of genocide more serious than a crime against humanity.
Compare, e.g., Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22, ¶ 26 (Oct. 7, 1997) (McDonald and
Vohrah, JJ., joint separate opinion) (invalidating Erdemović’s guilty plea in part because neither
defense counsel nor the Trial Chamber “had explained to [him] that a crime against humanity is a
more serious crime [than a war crime] and that if he had pleaded guilty to the alternative charge of a
war crime he could expect a correspondingly lighter punishment”), and Prosecutor v. Kambanda, Case
No. ICTR-97-23-S, ¶ 14 (Sept. 4, 1998) (expressing “no doubt” that “violations of Article 3 common
to the Geneva Conventions and of the Additional Protocol II thereto . . . are considered as lesser
crimes than genocide or crimes against humanity”), with Prosecutor v. Tadić, supra, ¶ 69 (“[T]here is
in law no distinction between the seriousness of a crime against humanity and that of a war crime.”).
The latter position has prevailed in the ICTY, though several jurists continue to dissent from it. E.g.,
Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, July 21, 2000 (declaration of Vohrah, J.).
93
Danner, supra note 1, at 465.
94
Of course, they may: the Ku Klux Klan or a neo-Nazi group, for example.
95
Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1538; see also id. at 1539 (arguing that, for example, “the guilt of
the German nation as a whole [for the crimes of the Nazis] should mitigate the guilt of particular
criminals like Eichmann, who is guilty to be sure, but guilty like so many others of a collective
crime,” and that “[c]onsidering the guilt of the nation in the sentencing process would provide a
concrete and practical way to recognize collective guilt in criminal trials”).
96
Rome Statute, art. 78, ¶ 1.
97
See Danner, supra note 1, at 470 n.228; see also Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1511–12
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tacit approval of a military or civilian elite often causes more aggregate harm
than the individual crimes, however deplorable, of a rank-and-file participant.
The cloak of collective authority poses a heightened danger, and its
98
manipulation and abuse by elites should be penalized accordingly.
Conversely, for rank-and-file participants, acting within a collective context
and often within a formal command structure, the collective nature of the
crimes arguably reduces their culpability. To appreciate why, we need to
consider not only the nature of the crimes but the sociopolitical context and
psychology of the perpetrators.
C. Nature of the Perpetrators: Moral Agency in the “Maelstrom of Violence”
1. The Plausibility of Moral Choice
Collective crimes frequently evolve from collective pathologies.
Reisman remarks that “many of the individuals who are directly responsible
[for ICL crimes] operate within a cultural universe that inverts our morality
and elevates their actions to the highest form of group, tribe, or national
defense. After years or generations of acculturation to these views, the
perpetrators may not have had the moral choice that is central to our notion of
99
criminal responsibility.” Tallgren argues to similar effect that “the offender
is likely to belong to a collective, sharing group values, possibly the same
nationalistic ideology. In such a situation, the offender may be less likely to
100
break the group values than the criminal norms.”
Citing Hannah Arendt’s
101
well-known reflections on the trial of Adolph Eichmann, Milgram’s famous
102
experiment, and other research on the “criminological, psychological and
103
sociological” characteristics of many ICL crimes and perpetrators, he
contends that “[c]ontrary to most national criminality which is understood to
constitute social deviation, acts addressed as international crimes can, in some

(“Criminal organizations pose a heightened danger in their collective interdependence and reciprocal
support, a danger that exceeds the aggregative threat of the individuals constituting a conspiracy.”).
98
While it would be misguided to assert categorically that elites always deserve more
punishment than subordinates, “the degree of responsibility generally increases as we draw further
away from the man who uses the fatal instrument with his own hands and reach the higher levels of
command.” Attorney-General v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 11, 237 (Isr. Sup. Ct. 1968). The sentencing
jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda recognizes this
aggravating circumstance under the rubric of abuse of power, authority or trust. E.g., Prosecutor v.
Kambanda, Case No. ICTR-97-23-S, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 44 (Sept. 4, 1998) (“Abuse of
positions of authority or trust is generally considered an aggravating factor.”); Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. IT-98-33, ¶ 709 (Aug. 2, 2001) (emphasizing that “a person who abuses or wrongly
exercises power deserves a harsher sentence than an individual acting on his or her own, for “[t]he
consequences of a person’s acts are necessarily more serious if he is at the apex of a military or
political hierarchy and uses his position to commit crimes”).
99
Reisman, supra note 14, at 77.
100
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 573.
101
ARENDT, supra note 7.
102
See generally STANLEY MILGRAM, OBEDIENCE TO AUTHORITY (1974).
103
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 571; see Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 606–17
(comprehensively reviewing the psychological and other social science literature on the effect of
collective action and social pressure on choice).
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circumstances, be constituted in terms of conforming to a norm.”
The collective pathology of international crimes must, in my view, be
factored into any morally and pragmatically defensible account of their
punishment. But the assertion that many perpetrators of serious international
crimes lack the kind of moral choice central to our ordinary conception of
criminal responsibility may imply two very different objections: first, from a
deontological perspective, that to punish behavior predetermined strongly or
even absolutely by circumstances beyond a person’s control is unjust; and
second, from a utilitarian perspective, that such punishment is simply
ineffective, for the person likely lacks the kind or degree of agency that makes
the threat of sanctions an appreciable deterrent. I consider the latter objection
below in connection with the analysis of deterrent rationales for punishment in
the ICL context. Here, I want to explore the former objection.
I doubt that it is accurate in any meaningful legal or moral sense to
conceive of ICL as a body of “criminal law that could be obeyed only by
exceptional individuals” or to assert that the typical perpetrator “could not have
105
acted or could not have been required to act otherwise.” To say that a person
“could not have acted otherwise” may mean either that (1) given a strong form
of philosophical determinism, no one can act otherwise than as he does, that
the very concept of moral responsibility is incoherent; or more modestly, (2)
given certain legal and normative assumptions about the conditions for
voluntary action that beget criminal responsibility, a particular criminal “could
not have acted otherwise” because one or more of those conditions did not
exist in the circumstances in which he acted; for example, he lacked the kind or
degree of control over his muscles or mind that humans ordinarily possess (or
106
believe they possess).
The former argument, that perpetrators of international crimes lack
moral choice, that is to say, choice of a kind or to a degree sufficient to justify
punishment, is a variant of a familiar reductio ad absurdum argument about
107
determinism and responsibility, the “argument from causation,” which
Michael Moore expresses succinctly in this syllogism:
1. All human actions and choices are caused by factors beyond
the actor’s control (the determinist premise).
2. If an action or choice is caused by factors beyond the actor’s
control, then that action or choice is morally excused (the
moral version of the causal theory of excuse).
3. If an action or choice is morally excused, then that action or
choice should not be legally punishable (the theory of
104

Tallgren, supra note 3, at 575 (footnote omitted); see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 549–50,
567–68; cf. ARENDT, supra note 7, at 294–95 (observing that in some circumstances ICL demands
“that human beings be capable of telling right from wrong even when all they have to guide them is
their own judgment, which, moreover, happens to be completely at odds with what they must regard
as the unanimous opinion of all those around them”).
105
Drumbl, supra note 4, at 135; see also Tallgren, supra note 3, at 573.
106
See HART, supra note 34, at 95–97 .
107
See John L. Hill, Freedom, Determinism, and the Externalization of Responsibility in the Law:
A Philosophical Analysis, 76 GEO. L.J. 2045, 2048–49 & n.16 (1988); see also Greenawalt, supra note
6, at 348; Michael S. Moore, Causation and the Excuses, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1091, 1112–13 (1986).
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punishment making moral culpability at least a necessary
condition of legal liability). Therefore:
4. No action and choices should be legally punishable (the
108
conclusion of universal legal excuse).
Few, however, really mean to challenge ICL’s legitimacy based on this
109
syllogism. While it is entirely coherent, which is not to say correct, it would
impugn not only the moral basis of ICL (and, for that matter, our intuitions
about national criminal law) but also many central precepts of civil law, such
as the voluntarist assumptions of contract law and the principle of fault in tort
law. Perhaps the strong form of philosophical determinism is accurate, but no
110
legal system can genuinely incorporate it and still function. No legal system
operates on the assumption that no one can be held responsible for anything,
that all conduct can ultimately be traced to some combination of hard-wired
internal circumstances, themselves a product of either nature or nurture, and
external circumstances—neither of which leaves room for a meaningful
conception of moral choice. The law operates in the realm of normative ethics,
not metaethics.
For this reason, it does not suffice to point to circumstances like war,
nationalistic fervor, or interethnic violence and assert categorically that
voluntary conduct sufficient to beget criminal responsibility under those
circumstances is a fiction. Perhaps extreme circumstances simply make it
easier to recognize that moral choice is always a fiction; they differ in degree
but not in kind. This form of hard determinism, in the ICL context, also does
not explain why the figurative compulsion created by circumstances of war,
mass violence, collective psychology, and so forth should be qualitatively
108

Moore, supra note 107, at 1113.
Id. at 1143 (arguing that criminal responsibility can be reconciled with determinism by
defining responsibility, as G.E. Moore did, to require only “the freedom (or power) to give effect to
one’s own desires,” that “[o]ne’s choices, or willings . . . themselves be causes of actions,” but not
“that such choices be uncaused” by extrinsic factors) (citing G.E. MOORE, ETHICS 84–95 (1912)). But
see Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability, in LIBERTY 94, 116 n.1 (Henry Hardy ed. 2002) (1969)
(criticizing a similar conception of freedom). The syllogism also relies on peculiarly modern
sensibilities about free will, desert, and moral responsibility. See FRIEDRICH NIETZSCHE, ON THE
GENEALOGY OF MORALITY 39 (Maudemarie Clark & Alan J. Swensen eds. & trans., 1998) (1887)
(“The thought, now so cheap and apparently so natural, so unavoidable, a thought that has even had to
serve as an explanation of how the feeling of justice came into being at all on earth—“the criminal has
earned his punishment because he could have acted otherwise”—is in fact a sophisticated form of
human judging and inferring that was attained extremely late; whoever shifts it to the beginning lays a
hand on the psychology of older humanity in a particularly crude manner.”).
110
See HERBERT PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 74–75 (1968) (“The idea of
free will in relation to conduct is not, in the legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value
preference having very little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free will. . . . Very simply,
the law treats man’s conduct as autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to
proceed as if it were.”); see also Isaiah Berlin, Historical Inevitability, in LIBERTY, supra note 109, at
122–23 (“I do not here wish to say that determinism is necessarily false, only that we neither speak
nor think as if it could be true, and that it is difficult, and perhaps beyond our normal powers, to
conceive what our picture of the world would be if we seriously believed it; so that to speak, as some
theorists of history (and scientists with a philosophical bent) tend to do, as if one might (in life and not
only in the study) accept the determinist hypothesis, and yet continue to think and speak much as we
do at present, is to breed intellectual confusion.”). A purely utilitarian criminal justice model can
justify punishment without denying strict determinism, for “[w]hether or not human acts are
completely determined by prior causes, punishment can be an efficacious prior cause.” Greenawalt,
supra note 6, at 352–53. But few theorists (and even fewer laypersons) embrace such models, which
remain subject to well-known objections.
109
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more problematic for the concept of moral choice than any other causal factor,
say, extreme socioeconomic deprivation.
Consider the “rotten social
background” defense: that a defendant’s economic and social background “so
greatly determines his or her criminal behavior that we feel it unfair to punish
111
At the theoretical level, given the strong form of
the individual.”
determinism, it is not clear that the excuse of duress, that the defendant had no
choice but to act as he did because of physical coercion, really differs from the
“rotten social background” defense, that the defendant had no choice but to act
as he did because of overpowering hard-wired impulses attributable to his
socioeconomic circumstances. Both defenses assert that certain causes,
whether a “gun to the head” or socioeconomic determinants, effectively
deprive a person of the agency required for moral choice and criminal
responsibility.
The point here is not to take sides in this perennial philosophical
debate; it is only to say that if we truly believe ICL punishment cannot be
justified where war criminals and génocidaires “could not have acted
otherwise,” that phrase must not be understood as a global claim about
determinism but, more modestly, as an assertion that certain legal and
normative assumptions we make about the conditions for voluntary action that
beget criminal responsibility do not exist under the circumstances. Yet the
nature and scope of the objection have never been articulated. The real task for
international criminal lawyers involves working out what conditions vitiate
112
moral or legal responsibility and why.
Did the person act under duress,
unusual provocation, fear, or diminished mental capacity? If so, should those
conditions exonerate or only mitigate punishment? The question, in the words
113
of the IMT, “whether moral choice was in fact possible,” must be considered
against the backdrop of the general philosophical presumptions common to
modern legal systems: agency, moral responsibility, culpability, and so
114
forth.
This is not to suggest that the dramatically distinct circumstances
characteristic of ICL violations and the collective character of the crimes
should be disregarded; to the contrary, they compel serious attention. But
categorical assertions about the nature (or lack) of moral choice evade rather
than offer guidance on the practical questions that international criminal
tribunals must address: to what extent such circumstances should be deemed
exculpatory, aggravating, or mitigating.

111

Richard Delgado, “Rotten Social Background”: Should the Criminal Law Recognize a
Defense of Severe Environmental Deprivation, in PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 249, 249
(Jeffrie G. Murphy, ed., 3d ed. 1995); see also David L. Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal Law,
49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385 (1976).
112
See, e.g., MICHAEL WALZER, JUST AND UNJUST WARS 304–27 (1977) (analyzing the
conditions of responsibility for war crimes); see also Fletcher, supra note 11, at 1543 (arguing that by
“creating an orthodoxy of hate,” the state or society bears collective guilt, for it “deprives people of
their second-order capacity to rein in their criminal impulses,” a factor that should in some
circumstances mitigate individual guilt and therefore punishment).
113
Judgment of the International Military Tribunal for the Trial of German Major War Criminals,
Nuremberg, Sept. 30 & Oct. 1, 1946, Cmd. 6964, reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172 (1947).
114
Cf. GABRIEL TARDE, PENAL PHILOSOPHY 55 (1912) (“The criminal, had he so wished,
external or internal circumstances remaining the same, could have not committed his crime; he
himself was aware of this possibility; therefore he is guilty of having committed it.”).
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2. Beyond Caricatures
Several competing visions of the perpetrators of ICL crimes
predominate in the literature arguably relevant to these questions. On one,
rooted in the social, historical, and psychological studies referred to earlier,
war criminals, génocidaires, and other participants in large-scale or systematic
human rights atrocities emerge as automatons enslaved by a mob mentality,
incited by ethnic, national, racial, or religious hatred, and so strongly
predisposed to criminal conduct that it arguably makes little sense to regard
them as moral agents accountable for their actions. (I stress that in practice
few defendants prosecuted by international tribunals resemble this caricature.)
The Rwandan genocide, in which thousands of Hutus systematically
slaughtered Tutsis with machetes and other rudimentary weapons offers an
115
(arguably) compelling example of this view. Consider, too, the child soldiers
enlisted by the Lord’s Resistance Army, the subject of the ICC’s first
investigation: Abducted as minors, compelled to kill and fight under duress,
and socially and psychologically conditioned to commit acts of extraordinary
116
brutality and violence, it surely makes little sense, from either a retributive or
consequentialist perspective, to prosecute and incarcerate them. Non-punitive
rehabilitation would be both more appropriate and more effective.
On another view, however, in tension with but paradoxically also
closely related to the first, the prototypical war criminal or génocidaire
emerges as Hannah Arendt’s Adolph Eichmann, the model of bureaucratic and
calculating, but at the same time banal, evil. While this vision, like the former,
characterizes the perpetrator as “ordinary,” it elicits very different intuitions
about the propriety of applying the criminal law paradigm. The rank-and-file
international criminal is not conceptualized as a mindless instrument of the
architects of ICL crimes, inculcated with ethnic hatred and psychologically
conditioned to act as he does, but rather as an ordinary person who consciously
chooses, albeit in an aberrant sociopolitical context, to participate in knowingly
horrendous acts, often for social, political, or economic gain. This vision of
the quintessential calculating bureaucrat, unlike the alternative one of the rankand-file perpetrator acting under the figurative compulsion of psychological,
social, and political circumstances, offers a far more compelling moral case for
applying the criminal law. Civilian and military elites present yet another
paradigm: Far from being unable to act otherwise, they personify the cynical,
deliberate, and calculated instigation of ICL crimes as a tool in the service of
greed or power.
None of these caricatures, of course, accurately portrays the nature of
all war criminals and génocidaires or captures the tremendously complex
constellation of factors that may lead persons to engage in unconscionable
crimes. It seems equally misguided to either denounce or condone the
propriety of applying principles of national criminal law to ICL crimes on the
basis of them. What we need is greater sensitivity not only to the gravity of the
crime, but to the individual circumstances of the defendant, in particular his
115

See, e.g., GÉRARD PRUNIER, THE RWANDA CRISIS 243 (1995).
See HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, STOLEN CHILDREN: ABDUCTION AND RECRUITMENT IN
NORTHERN UGANDA (2003); HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, THE SCARS OF DEATH (1997).
116
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role and background. ICL undoubtedly seeks to regulate and judge conduct in
circumstances of war, ethnic violence, and other extreme conditions that differ
radically from those prevailing in a well-ordered, peacetime society—
circumstances that arguably expose the tenuousness of common assumptions
about moral choice, responsibility, and culpability. To some degree, however,
those assumptions underlie the criminal law generally; they do not, by
themselves, constitute a global objection to ICL. Rather, the radically different
circumstances in which ICL violations typically occur affect how, not whether,
these assumptions apply. The extent to which the conventional rationales for
punishment can or should be transposed to ICL depends on paying closer
attention to the nature and circumstances of the violations, a process most
effectively addressed not in the context of trial, where the determination of
guilt or innocence rightly predominates, but at sentencing.
III. FROM RETRIBUTIVE ORIGINS TO AN EMERGING JURISPRUDENCE
A. Postwar Origins
How well has ICL sentencing addressed these issues? The historical
record is poor. ICL’s components, especially the laws of war, originated well
before Nuremberg, and history offers several early examples of international
efforts to prosecute war criminals and other perpetrators of what would now be
117
But the discipline of ICL as a distinct legal field
defined as ICL crimes.
originated in the aftermath of World War II. Regrettably, if understandably,
the emotive atmosphere in which it developed did not conduce to sustained
consideration of the goals of punishment and sentencing. At the time, the very
notion that the most culpable Axis leaders and war criminals, men like
Göering, should be subjected to the unwieldy and costly processes of the law
proved controversial. Far from raising questions about the rationale for their
punishment, international criminal trials emerged as an alternative to the
proposal, espoused by Winston Churchill among others, that Axis leaders be
summarily executed by firing squad. In the oft-quoted statement of Anthony
Eden, then Britain’s Foreign Secretary, many felt that the Axis leadership’s
118
“guilt was so black” that it fell “beyond the scope of any judicial process.”
While the American, French, and Soviet position in favor of the establishment
of an international tribunal ultimately prevailed, no one questioned that the
sentence for the major architects of the Axis crimes, absent very compelling
119
mitigating factors, should be death. Customary international law at the time
120
also prescribed capital punishment for war crimes.
The IMT Charter therefore authorized “death or such other punishment
121
as shall be determined . . . to be just,” and the International Military Tribunal
117

See BASS, supra note 3, at 5 (characterizing war crimes trials as “a fairly regular part of
international politics” that emerged well before Nuremberg).
118
TELFORD TAYLOR, THE ANATOMY OF THE NUREMBERG TRIALS 29 (1992).
119
See Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 180–81.
120
Id. at 171 n.2; see also HOWARD S. LEVIE, TERRORISM IN WAR 264 (1993).
121
Agreement for the Prosecution and Punishment of Major War Criminals of the European Axis,
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for the Far East (IMTFE) adopted this skeletal sentencing provision
122
verbatim. The judgments of each paid scant attention to sentencing. Neither
123
held distinct sentencing hearings.
Despite a few isolated statements
justifying international punishment by reference to its presumed deterrent
124
value, the principal impetus for punishment after World War II consisted of
an emotive reaction to the sheer magnitude and unconscionability of the
crimes. Insofar as a coherent penal theory can be inferred from the postwar
125
trials, it seems to be a crude retributivism, notwithstanding Justice Jackson’s
famous remark in his opening statement before the IMT: “That four great
nations, flushed with victory and stung with injury, stay the hand of vengeance
and voluntarily submit their captive enemies to the judgment of the law is one
126
of the most significant tributes that Power has ever paid to Reason.”
B. International Human Rights: Abolitionism, Proportionality, and the
International Rehabilitative Ideal
In time, however, international human rights law evolved to aspire to
abolish the death penalty, and more generally, to emphasize rehabilitation as
127
the paramount goal of punishment. The International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, for example, limits the application of the death penalty with a
view to its ultimate abolition and describes “reformation and social
128
rehabilitation” as “the essential aim” of incarceration. Indeed, a number of
European states regard life imprisonment as “cruel, inhuman or degrading
129
punishment” contrary to modern human rights norms. These developments,
of course, sit uneasily with the sentencing practices of the postwar tribunals.
International law also embraces proportionality in sentencing as a general
principle of law. Contemporary international criminal tribunals must develop
some principled way to distinguish between crimes that, in their sheer

art. 27, Aug. 8, 1945, 59 Stat. 1544, 82 U.N.T.S. 279.
122
Charter for the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, art. 16, Apr. 26, 1946, T.I.A.S.
No. 1589.
123
Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 461 & n.2 (1997).
124
See Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 173–74.
125
Daniel B. Pickard, Proposed Sentencing Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 20
LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 123, 129–39 (1997); Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1,
at 189; Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 500–01.
126
TAYLOR, supra note 118, at 167.
127
Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 464, 503; see generally WILLIAM A.
SCHABAS, THE ABOLITION OF THE DEATH PENALTY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (3d ed. 2002).
128
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), Dec. 19, 1966, arts. 6(2), 6(5)–
(6), 10(3), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see also Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 44/128, Annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 207, U.N. Doc.
A/44/49 (1989); American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, arts. 4(2)–(5), 5(6), 1114
U.N.T.S. 123; Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, art. 58, U.N. Doc.
A/CONF/611 (1957), Annex 1, E.S.C. Res. 663C, 24 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, U.N. Doc. E/3048,
amended by E.S.C. Res. 2076, 62 U.N. ESCOR Supp. No. 1, at 35, U.N. Doc. E/5988 (1977);
Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms Concerning the Abolition of the Death Penalty, April 28, 1983, Europ. T.S. No. 114.
129
Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 176–77 & n.49; Schabas, A Human Rights
Approach, supra note 16, at 480, 509.
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magnitude and brutality, all seem to demand severe punishment.
Surely,
Duško Tadić, notwithstanding a conviction for crimes against humanity and
war crimes that included horrific acts of murder and torture, should not be
deemed as culpable or sentenced as severely as Jean Kambanda, the former
interim prime minister of Rwanda and a principal architect of the genocide.
But it is unclear what factors should be considered to arrive at an appropriate
sentence for each—or for those defendants that do not fall clearly into the polar
categories of “big fish” and “small fry.”
International human rights law thus renders the retributivist impulse
for ICL punishment, as manifested in the post-World War II trials,
conceptually and practically problematic. It is difficult to conceive of a
punishment other than death that could fit most serious ICL crimes in a talionic
sense. Yet authorizing capital punishment in constitutive ICL instruments
would undermine international efforts to abolish it categorically. More
generally, it is far from clear that terms of incarceration imposed by
international tribunals can, even assuming they should, rehabilitate serious war
criminals and génocidaires. Until recently, few ICL judgments even
131
mentioned rehabilitation as a sentencing objective;
some explicitly
132
The sentencing judgments of the ad hoc
discounted its value or propriety.
tribunals refer variously, and without much elaboration or consistency, to
133
retribution and deterrence as the twin goals of sentencing.
C. The Beginnings of an ICL Sentencing Jurisprudence
The ICTY and ICTR Statutes represent only a slight improvement over
their predecessor instruments in this regard. Each contains a skeletal provision
vesting the tribunals with discretion to impose a term of imprisonment based
on “such factors as the gravity of the offence and the individual circumstances
of the convicted person”; a renvoi to the national practice of the former
134
The
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, respectively; and a provision for restitution.
Rules of Procedure and Evidence developed by the tribunals augment this
minimal framework, but only in abstract terms, providing for consideration of
aggravating and mitigating circumstances, without specifying which factors
135
might qualify. The jurisprudence of the tribunals has gone some way toward
130

Prosecutor v. Blaskíc, Case No. IT-95-14, ¶ 796 (Mar. 3, 2000), (recognizing proportionality
as a general principle of law); see also Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Case No. ICTR-96-4, Sentence, ¶ 40
(Oct. 2, 1998); Danner, supra note 1, at 450 & nn.127–28. In Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR96-13-A, (Nov. 16, 2001), the Appeals Chamber rejected the argument that the defendant’s life
sentence should be reduced because an (arguably) similarly situated defendant, Serushago, had
received only fifteen years’ imprisonment. The court concluded that despite “superficial similarities,”
Musema’s case, unlike Serushago’s, did not present “exceptional circumstances in mitigation,” and
“[c]onsequently, the circumstances of the two cases are not so similar to justify a claim that the Trial
Chamber erred by imposing a disproportionate sentence in respect of Musema.” Id. ¶ 390.
131
Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 190; Mark A. Drumbl & Kenneth S.
Gallant, Sentencing Policies and Practices in the International Criminal Tribunals, 15 FED. SENT. R.
140, 2002 WL 32121741, at *3 (Dec. 2002).
132
E.g., Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No. IT-96-23, Sentencing Judgment, ¶ 844 (Feb. 22, 2001).
133
Danner, supra note 1, at 444 & n.109.
134
ICTY Statute, supra note 4, art. 24; ICTR Statute, supra note 4, art. 23.
135
ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 101; ICTR Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
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filling out these gaps. Both the ICTY and ICTR have considered a variety of
aggravating and mitigating factors, including, in the former category,
“leadership (superior) position of the accused, terrorizing victims, sadism,
cruelty and humiliation, espousal of ethnic and religious discrimination, and
the number of victims”; and in the latter, “superior orders, necessity, duress,
voluntary intoxication, automatism, insanity, and self-defense,” as well as
“entry of a guilty plea and acceptance of responsibility, remorse, voluntary
surrender to the tribunal(s), ‘substantial’ cooperation with the prosecutor, postconflict conduct, previous good character, benevolent attitude toward the
136
victims, and age.”
137
These factors largely mirror those common to national legal systems.
Notably absent is any explicit consideration of the social, political or
psychological circumstances characteristic of war and other large-scale
violence; or of the collective nature of the crimes—factors which may,
depending on the status of the accused, either aggravate or mitigate individual
culpability. In Prosecutor v. Krstic, the ICTY said that,
[i]n determining the appropriate sentence, a distinction is to be
made between the individuals who allowed themselves to be
drawn into a maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly, and those
who initiated or aggravated it and thereby more substantially
contributed to the overall harm. Indeed, reluctant participation
in the crimes may in some instances be considered as a
138
mitigating circumstance.
That statement, however, stands virtually alone in the jurisprudence; the
139
tribunals have implemented it, if at all, haphazardly.
ICL sentencing has thus evolved from retributive origins at Nuremberg
to an increasingly nuanced body of law that recognizes the complexity of
punishment in the context of catastrophic violence or war, defying the simple
classification of ICL violations as obviously calling for the death penalty. At
the same time, confusion about the justifications for punishment and its
140
distribution among different kinds of defendants plagues the jurisprudence.
Furthermore, while the judgments of international criminal courts often
Rule 101. The sole exception to this general lack of concrete guidance in the positive law is that both
statutes specify superior orders as a mitigating factor. ICTY Statute, art. 7, ¶ 4; ICTR Statute, supra
note 4, art. 6, ¶ 4.
136
M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL LAW 327–28
(2003) (footnotes omitted); see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 561–66 (surveying aggravating and
mitigating factors cited by international and hybrid criminal courts); Beresford, supra note 43, at 53–
82 (surveying penal jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals for Rwanda and Yugoslavia).
137
Drumbl, supra note 4, at 565.
138
See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 711 (Aug. 2, 2001).
139
In Prosecutor v. Blaskíc, No. IT-95-14, Trial Chamber (Mar. 3, 2000), the Trial Chamber
observed: “It appears that, independently of duress, the context in which the crimes were committed,
namely the conflict, is usually taken into consideration in determining the sentence to be imposed.
Such was the case in the Tadić, Celebici and Aleksovski cases. Though mentioned in these cases, this
factor does not seem to have been decisive in fixing the sentence.” Id. ¶ 770.
140
See Ralph Henham, The Philosophical Foundations of International Sentencing, 1 J. INT’L
CRIM. J. 64, 65 (2003); see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 566.
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describe the crimes as comparatively more severe than crimes of violence
141
under national law, such as murder, the penalties imposed for them often
142
seem incongruously lenient, at least by a retributive metric.
The ICTR
recently noted, for example, that rape, torture, and murder as crimes against
humanity have been punished by average sentences of, respectively, between
143
twelve and fifteen years, five and twelve years, and twelve and twenty years.
In short, the present state of the law on international sentencing resembles in a
number of respects that of the indeterminate federal sentencing system
critiqued by Judge Frankel in his famous polemic, Criminal Sentences: Law
144
Without Order.
IV. LEGITIMACY, EFFICACY, AND THE EXPRESSIVE CAPACITY OF
INTERNATIONAL PUNISHMENT
Conventional justifications for punishment fall into two broad
categories: crime-control and retributivist theories. The former includes
145
deterrence, specific and general; incapacitation, which can be conceived as
an extreme form of specific deterrence insofar as, if successful, it obviates any
146
recidivism concerns; and rehabilitation. The latter, retributivism or “just
deserts,” though often conceived in Kantian terms, originated in theological
conceptions of justice, and from an anthropological perspective, in the lex
talionis common to many early legal systems.
Given the diversity of transnational penal interests and the diversity of
147
views about what counts as an appropriate justification for punishment, it
141

Glickman, supra note 40, at 230; see also Danner, supra note 1, at 488.
Glickman, supra note 40, at 247–48 & n.70.
143
Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20-T, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 564 (May 15,
2003).
144
MARVIN E. FRANKEL, CRIMINAL SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER (1973).
145
Specific deterrence, punishment’s tendency to prevent the person punished from himself
engaging in future criminal conduct, has rightly been marginalized in the sentencing jurisprudence of
the ad hoc tribunals, for “the likelihood of persons convicted here ever again being faced with an
opportunity to commit war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote
as to render its consideration in this way unreasonable and unfair.” Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No.
IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ¶ 840 (Feb. 22, 2001).
146
Incapacitation, an extreme form of specific deterrence, seems equally inapposite. With the
exception, perhaps, of some future Napoleon, few war criminals seem to pose a real danger of
recidivism requiring incapacitation. By the time most orchestrators of serious human rights atrocities
can be apprehended and prosecuted, they typically pose no future danger. Some may nonetheless
deserve a life sentence, but not because of concerns about future dangerousness were they released
after a finite term. On the other hand, indictment, investigation, and prosecution can disempower,
discredit, and delegitimize tyrannical leaders, stigmatizing them as international fugitives, unable to
travel freely, and at risk of having their assets frozen. Developments in the Law: International
Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1962 & n.31 (2001). Milosevic’s indictment, for example,
arguably contributed to his political demise. Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International
Criminal Justice Prevent Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J. INT’L L. 7, 9 (2001) [hereinafter Akhavan,
Beyond Impunity]. The saga of Pinochet’s attempted prosecution by Spain under a theory of universal
jurisdiction likewise seems to have lifted the veneer of political invulnerability that formerly
prevented local efforts to bring him to justice. This quasi-incapacitative goal, however, is a political
tool that precedes the trial process; or, following Hart, it may be understood as one justification for the
establishment of an international criminal justice system but not, I think, as a consideration relevant to
the distribution of punishment, that is, to sentencing.
147
See, e.g., John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 PHIL. REV. 3, 4 (1955).
142
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would be misguided and likely futile to offer a monolithic theory about the
148
goals of international sentencing.
Furthermore, particularly in the
international context, it is important to bear in mind H.L.A. Hart’s insight that
the “general justifying aim” for punishment need not be coterminous with the
justification for its application or proper distribution in concrete cases: the
questions “why punish,” “who should be punished,” and “how much should
149
Most ICL scholarship
they be punished” may be usefully distinguished.
addresses the former, logically antecedent, question: Why establish an
international criminal justice system? But as we move from theory to practice,
from the justification for an international system of punishment to the
operationalization of that system, we confront, in the end, individuals rather
than abstractions. The rhetorical goals of international justice offer little
guidance on whether the gravity of a defendant’s crimes and his individual
circumstances call for a term of incarceration of five years, twenty-five years
or life.
Each conventional goal of punishment in national law offers insights,
but analysis of the extent to which retributive and deterrence theories can or
should be coherently transposed to the international context reveals that the
primary value that international punishment can realistically serve consists in
150
An expressivist account of punishment best
its expressive functions.
captures both the nature of international sentencing and its most promising
institutional capacity to make a difference given the momentous political and
resource constraints that international tribunals inevitably face, for ICL’s
ability to contribute to crime-control and retributive goals ultimately depends
in large part on its value, legitimacy, and persuasiveness as authoritative
expression. This conclusion counsels more attention to the sentencing process
than international tribunals have historically paid.
Expressivism is not or need not be, strictly speaking, a self-sufficient
151
“justification” for punishment; it is a function and essential characteristic of
punishment as a social institution. Incarceration and other forms of “hard
treatment” do not impose suffering only, or even primarily, as a means to deter
crime or to exact a debt owed by the criminal to society. Rather, “punishment
is a conventional device for the expression of attitudes of resentment and
indignation, and of judgments of disapproval and reprobation, on the part
either of the punishing authority himself or of those ‘in whose name’ the
punishment is inflicted. Punishment, in short, has a symbolic significance

148

(1958).

149

Cf. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 401, 401

Hart, supra note 34, at 3–5; see also Rawls, supra note 147, at 5 (proposing, in the context of
penal theory, a distinction between “justifying a practice as a system of rules to be applied and
enforced, and justifying a particular action which falls under those rules”). But see JEREMY
WALDRON, THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 331 (1988) (arguing that “[w]hether an account of the
General Justifying Aim of an institution generates any implications so far as distribution is concerned
depends entirely on the character of the General Justifying Aim”).
150
See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 95, 98; see also ROBERT NOZICK, PHILOSOPHICAL
EXPLANATIONS 370–74 (1981).
151
See Kahan, supra note 17, at 601 (defending a view of expressivism that “demurs to the claim
of analytical interdependence” but shows that, nonetheless, expressivism necessarily informs
“plausible conceptions of deterrence and retributivism”).
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152

largely missing from other kinds of penalties.”
As a descriptive matter, expressivism aptly captures the nature of ICL
punishment and the characteristic tenor of the sentencing judgments of the ad
153
hoc tribunals. By punishing the perpetrators of serious international crimes,
to paraphrase Feinberg, the international community attempts authoritatively to
disavow that conduct, to indicate symbolically its refusal to acquiesce in the
crimes, to vindicate international human rights norms and the laws of war, and
to absolve ethnic or national communities, as collectives, of guilt by punishing
154
individual perpetrators.
As a normative matter, the expressive functions of punishment can be
transposed to the distinct moral and institutional context of ICL without
straining the coherence of the national law analogy, for expressivism selfconsciously focuses less on the immediate instrumental value of punishment—
as a tool of either retribution or deterrence on the rational actor model—and
more on the long-term normative values served by any system of criminal law.
It may well be quixotic to expect ICL to exert a significant deterrent effect on
war criminals and génocidaires merely through its potential to increase the
perceived costs of international crime. It may well be morally problematic for
international tribunals, which represent and serve the interests of a figurative
international community, to regard themselves as agents of retribution on
behalf of victims who often regard them as illegitimate or worse. But
international sentencing holds the potential effectively to fulfill the expressive
155
function of punishment by conveying its distinctive symbolic significance.
And insofar as deterrent and retributive theories of punishment can be
transposed to the ICL context notwithstanding flaws in the national law
analogy, it is largely because of the expressive dimensions of punishment.
A. Deterrence
1. The Benthamite Model
Human rights activists, diplomats, scholars, prosecutors, jurists, and
journalists alike frequently ascribe the recurrence of large-scale human
156
atrocities to impunity, by which they generally mean the absence of criminal
punishment. Kenneth Roth, the executive director of Human Rights Watch,
argues that “[b]ehind much of the savagery of modern history lies impunity.
Tyrants commit atrocities, including genocide, when they calculate they can

152

FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 98; see also Hart, supra note 148, at 404–05; Kahan, supra note
17, at 593 (“Punishment is not just a way to make offenders suffer; it is a special social convention
that signifies moral condemnation.”).
153
Amann, supra note 48, at 123 (noting that “[t]he judgments of ad hoc tribunals have retained
an expressivist flavor”); Danner, supra note 1, at 490 & n.308 (collecting illustrative cases).
154
See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 101–05.
155
Adjudication, too, may serve expressivist values and objectives, but as emphasized at the
outset, efforts to modify the ICL trial process itself would be both impracticable and unwise from a
broader policy perspective. See supra text accompanying note 16.
156
See Danner, supra note 1, at 446 nn.115–17.
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157

get away with them.” Writing in favor of the ICTY, Theodor Meron, now
one of its judges, suggested that “[a]bandoning the tribunal now would have a
negative impact on the behavior of the parties to the conflict . . . . On the
ground, those committing war crimes would infer that regardless of their past
or future violations they will not be held criminally accountable by the
158
On this view, punishment deters because
international community.”
potential war criminals know and fear the consequence of the law, that is, the
159
pain of incarceration, and act to avoid it.
But in the first place, deterrence, so conceived, requires the credible
and authoritative communication of a threatened sanction. The figurative
nature of the international community poses tremendous obstacles to this
enterprise. It is one thing for a criminal justice system clearly to communicate
a threat within a literal community, for example, a state or political
subdivision, where constituents speak the same language, share sources of
information, witness, at least intermittently, the operation of the machinery of
the criminal justice system (police, courts, etc.), and ideally have good reason
160
to believe, as Holmes wrote, that the law will keep its promises. It is quite
another for a culturally foreign and geographically distant tribunal, which lacks
its own police force and enforces the law sporadically and inconsistently at
best, to communicate a credible threat authoritatively, particularly where local
norms, as Arendt and others have emphasized, may point strongly in the
opposite direction.
Second, if the rational-actor model of deterrence is suspect in the
national context, it is exponentially so in the international, where war, largescale violence, and collective pathologies, as well as the institutional and
resource limitations of ICL, can be expected to distort the viability of the
familiar cost-benefit calculus on which that model depends. It is doubtful that
the average war criminal or génocidaire weighs the risk of prosecution,
discounted by the likelihood of apprehension, against the perceived benefits of
his crimes. And even if he does, “it is not irrational to ignore the improbable
161
prospect of punishment given the track record of international law thus far.”
Third, the collective nature of ICL crimes means that “group think,”
157

150.

158

Kenneth Roth, The Case for Universal Jurisdiction, FOREIGN AFF., Sept./Oct. 2001 150, at

THEODOR MERON, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, in WAR CRIMES LAW
COMES OF AGE, 187, 196 (1998). Much of the jurisprudence of the ad hoc tribunals emphasizes the
deterrent objective of punishment. E.g., Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, No. ICTR-96-3-T, ¶ 456 (Dec. 6,
1999); Prosecutor v. Delalić, No. IT-96-21-T, ¶ 1234 (Nov. 16, 1998); Prosecutor v. Kambanda, No.
ICTR-97-23-S, ¶ 26 (Sept. 4, 1998).
159
See Richard Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1193
(1985)
160
1 HOLMES-LASKI LETTERS 806 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed. 1953); see also OLIVER WENDELL
HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 46–47 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963) (1881).
161
MINOW, supra note 48, at 50; David Wippman, Atrocities, Deterrence, and the Limits of
International Justice, 23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 473, 476–77 (1999) (“For most offenders, especially
low-ranking offenders, the risk of prosecution must appear to be almost the equivalent of losing the
war crimes prosecution lottery.”); see also Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 741;
Alvarez, supra note 51, at 2079–80; Danner, supra note 1, at 439 & n.97; Tallgren, supra note 3, at
570–76. In fact, scant empirical evidence exists on the deterrent potential of ICL. Historical and
anecdotal evidence is inconclusive at best. See BASS, supra note 3, at 290–95; Fletcher & Weinstein,
supra note 8, at 592; Theodor Meron, War Crimes Law Comes of Age, 92 AM. J. INT’L L. 462, 463
(1998); Wippman, supra, at 474–75.
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undue obedience to authority, and other phenomena familiar from the social
psychology research canvassed by Fletcher and Weinstein may well interfere
162
with this kind of calculation. Bentham wrote that punishment cannot deter
“[w]here the penal provision, though it were conveyed to a man’s notice, could
produce no effect on him, with respect to preventing him from engaging in any
163
While he had in mind circumstances like
act of the sort in question.”
infancy, insanity, and intoxication, the principle applies equally to any
psychological or physical condition that negates or overrides the fear of penal
sanctions. The chaotic circumstances of war, large-scale violence, ethnic
conflict, or genocide clearly qualify.
We should avoid overstating these critiques. They do not show that,
164
for ICL, “deterrence doesn’t work.”
In the first place, skepticism about
deterrence is not unique to ICL. Within nation-states, too, the evidence
165
supporting general deterrence is inconclusive and difficult to interpret. Few
believe that would-be war criminals will “read the resolutions of the Security
Council and stop their grave violations of international humanitarian law” or
“be indoctrinated to refrain from further breaches of the law and to support the
shared values of the international community if one of [their] co-fighters . . .
166
receive[s] a 15-year prison sentence in the Hague.” But equally, few believe
that “ordinary” murderers consult national penal statutes and undertake costbenefit analyses before killing.
Furthermore, as emphasized earlier, it would be misguided to
assimilate all war criminals and génocidaires to a single psychosocial profile,
say, that of the paranoid automaton, inculcated with hatred and psychologically
conditioned to act as he does by propaganda, social pressure, primordial
cultural influences, and so forth. Often, elites responsible for large-scale or
systematic international crimes can be described accurately as “conflict
entrepreneurs,” those who manipulate values and the tools of state power as a
167
This
means to aggrandize their own social, economic, or political power.
vision of the typical criminal not only seems intuitively more blameworthy
than the rank-and-file perpetrator swept up in the “maelstrom of violence,” but
also, perhaps, more deterrable. While elites may calculate that the risk of
apprehension and prosecution remains insignificant, the fact remains that they
calculate, weighing costs and benefits in a manner that seems more susceptible
to external incentives.
Finally, the power of ICL to disempower elites through stigma and
162

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 603–17; see also Wippman, supra note 161, at 479
(“The natural human tendency to obey authority is compounded by military training, propaganda
vilifying members of the opposite community, a belief in the justice of one’s cause, and the threat of
penalties, including execution, for failure to comply with orders.”).
163
Jeremy Bentham, Introduction to the Principles of Morals and Legislation (1824), reprinted in
JOHN STUART MILL & JEREMY BENTHAM, UTILITARIANISM AND OTHER ESSAYS 99 (Alan Ryan ed.,
Penguin Books 1987).
164
JAMES Q. WILSON, THINKING ABOUT CRIME 121 (rev. ed. 1983); see also id. at 123 (noting
that a number of well-designed studies indicate that deterrence does work to some degree and in
certain contexts).
165
See id. at 117–21.
166
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 567.
167
See Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, The New Imperialism: Violence, Norms, and the “Rule of Law,”
101 MICH. L. REV. 2275, 2302 (2003).

74

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

43:39

reputational injury should not be underestimated. “Leaders may be desperate,
erratic, or even psychotic, but incitement to ethnic violence is usually aimed at
the acquisition and sustained exercise of power. . . . Momentary glory and
political ascendancy, to be followed by downfall and humiliation, are
168
considerably less attractive than long-term political viability.” In this regard,
the mere issuance of an indictment, the very prospect of a trial, is itself the
“punishment” by which ICL may deter. While the deterrence value of ICL,
conceived in utilitarian terms, remains largely aspirational, available empirical
evidence does suggest that it has “dissuad[ed] some war crimes,” albeit not
“general programs of extermination,” and its prospects may be enhanced by a
“relatively credible threat of prosecution” where it matters the most, that is,
169
relative to elites.
Still, to paraphrase Jeffrey Murphy’s summary of the problems with
deterrence generally: Some war criminals and génocidaires do not weigh the
costs and benefits of criminal conduct in a dispassionate way (though it would
likely be wrong to say that they act irrationally relative to their perceived
interests).
Others, particularly megalomaniacal elites, calculate (often
correctly), that they will get away with it, or that the risk of apprehension and
prosecution remains small. Still others may be so idiosyncratically devoted to
genocide or ethnic cleansing as to be “undeterrable by anything short of
170
Often, the chief war
massive military force, and maybe not even that.”
criminals will be coterminous with a state’s political elite; national
prosecutorial and judicial institutions may be too corrupt or subservient to that
elite class; and ordinary moral norms about the treatment of other human
beings may be eroded, if not inverted, by the circumstances of war or
perceived crisis. While some elites may be susceptible to deterrence on the
rational-actor model, other megalomaniacal tyrants—Milosevic, Pol Pot, Idi
Amin, “Emperor” Bokassa—tend to share a psychological sense of infallibility
and invulnerability that makes it less likely that they will rationally weigh the
real probability of apprehension and prosecution, even if it can be increased,
against their immediate goals: power, territorial acquisition, or obliteration of
171
In his opening statement at Nuremberg, Justice Jackson
an ethnic group.
168

Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 146, at 12. To maximize the deterrent value of ICL,
then, prosecutors probably should focus, as they increasingly have, on increasing the real risk of
apprehension and prosecution for the elites who orchestrate ICL crimes rather than the rank and file
mobilized to carry them out. Empirical studies validate a view expressed early on by Beccaria:
“Crimes are more effectively prevented by the certainty than the severity of punishment.” Cesare
Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764), in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND LEGAL
PHILOSOPHY 346, 349 (Morris R. Cohen & Felix S. Cohen eds., 1951); accord Prosecutor v.
Furundžija, Case No. IT-95-17/1-T, ¶ 290 (Dec. 10, 1998) (“It is the infallibility of punishment, rather
than the severity of the sanction, which is the tool for retribution, stigmatisation, and deterrence.”).
For an overview of the empirical work, see generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH, ET AL., CRIMINAL
DETERRENCE AND SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH (1999).
169
BASS, supra note 3, at 294. From a pragmatic perspective, prosecuting elites, somewhat
counter-intuitively, actually requires fewer resources relative to the breadth of the indictments than
cases against low-level perpetrators, for the doctrine of command responsibility sweeps a wider
evidentiary net, expands the limits of relevant evidence, and “[a]ccordingly, the temporal and
geographical scope of evidence that may be invoked in support of prosecutions is very wide.”
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 779.
170
BASS, supra note 3, at 291; see JEFFRIE G. MURPHY & JULES L. COLEMAN, PHILOSOPHY OF
LAW: AN INTRODUCTION TO JURISPRUDENCE 119 (1990).
171
This is not, of course, to suggest that such figures cannot act rationally. Saddam Hussein
acted rationally when he agreed to permit U.N. inspectors back into the country in the wake of a
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emphasized that “[p]ersonal punishment, to be suffered only in the event the
war is lost, is probably not to be a sufficient deterrent to prevent a war where
172
the war-makers feel the chances of defeat to be negligible.”
Because of the institutional and resource constraints that plague
international tribunals, their mere existence cannot be expected to enhance the
prospects for deterrence very much. Their efficacy depends more on their
ability to contribute to the growth and development of national laws, ethical
norms, and institutions, as well as to encourage and, at times, compel national
criminal justice systems genuinely to investigate and prosecute. For this
reason, the expressive value of ICL sentences—the extent to which they
convey, reinforce, and encourage the growth of national legal and moral norms
that conform to ICL—matters more than the relative severity of the
punishment in any individual case. International criminal tribunals will deter
most effectively, on the Benthamite model, if they encourage the growth of
national institutions, laws, and ethical norms that can be applied with greater
regularity and frequency.
2. The Moral Educative Model
General deterrence operates not only, or even primarily, through
external restraints, that is, because subjects hear and fear the relevant
173
The criminal law also deters
sovereign’s commands backed by threats.
through its long-term role in shaping, strengthening, and inculcating values,
174
which encourages the development of habitual, internal restraints: “The law
can discourage criminality not just by ‘raising the cost’ of such behavior
through punishments, but also through instilling aversions to the kinds of
175
behavior that the law prohibits.” In the long term, this effect of punishment
likely deters far more criminal conduct than conscious rational calculation
based on a fear of sanctions. Most people do not resemble Holmes’s “bad
man,” obeying the law based only on “a prophecy that if he does certain things
he will be subjected to disagreeable consequences by way of imprisonment or
176
the compulsory payment of money.” In general, “the most effective form of
law-enforcement is not the imposition of external sanction, but the inculcation
177
of internal obedience.”
Payam Akhavan, a strong proponent of this view
relative to ICL, argues that criminal sanctions
instill voluntary or “good faith” respect for just conduct by
unanimously adopted Security Council resolution 1441. S.C. Res. 1441 (Nov. 8, 2002), 41 I.L.M. 250
(2003). Slobodan Milosevic acted rationally when he agreed to the Dayton Peace Accords. But the
prospect of serving a sentence of incarceration for war crimes will be unlikely to enter into the rational
calculations of such elites unless and until they believe that they may lose.
172
II TRIALS OF THE MAJOR WAR CRIMINALS BEFORE THE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY
TRIBUNAL 102 (1947).
173
See generally JOHN AUSTIN, THE PROVINCE OF JURISPRUDENCE DETERMINED (1832).
174
Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 351.
175
Kahan, supra note 17, at 603.
176
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 461 (1897).
177
Harold Hongju Koh, How Is International Human Rights Law Enforced?, 74 IND. L. REV.
1397, 1401 (1999)
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discrediting inhumane or unjust conduct, the cumulative effect
of which encourages habitual or subliminal conformity with
the law. Thus, the prevention of future crimes is necessarily a
long-term process of social and political transformation,
entailing internalization of ideals in a particular context or
“reality,” or the gradual penetration of principles into given
178
power realities.
This claim, however, brings us back full circle to the political, social,
and psychological issues flagged earlier. Deterrent mechanisms that rely on
internal restraints, habituation to moral and legal norms, require a criminal
179
justice system perceived as authoritative and legitimate. But many targets of
ICL, persons willing to perpetrate unconscionable crimes, do not regard the
180
system in that way.
The rank and file, acting under the figurative
compulsion of an inverted morality or collective pathology whereby ordinarily
“prohibited conduct starts to appear as a holy obligation, a positive
achievement,” will be unlikely to view their conduct as deviant relative to the
181
community norms that matter most, that is, local ones. As for the elite, those
who manipulate values in the service of power, they already, by hypothesis,
lack the internalized norms by which the moral-educative effect of punishment
is thought to operate.
Finally, at least one study “suggests that the internalization of norms is
182
not sufficient to prevent atrocities.” David Wippman, reviewing findings of
the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) on war crimes in BosniaHerzegovina, notes that the ICRC concluded that such norms, while fully
understood, supported, and accepted by combatants and civilians alike, “broke
down under the pressure of nationalist passions and hatred. They also broke
down because a range of other wartime considerations diminished and
183
superceded them.”
These observations suggest that once the social, cultural, or political
circumstances for the widespread manipulation of moral norms obtain, the
efficacy of ICL as a mechanism of deterrence is slight. As much as possible,
we should strive to prevent, not only individual criminal acts, but the
emergence of the sociopolitical circumstances that breed mass atrocities in the
184
first place. Prophylactic strategies intended to address the roots of conflict
178

Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 741.
Kahan, supra note 17, at 603 (“This sort of preference adaptation [to values embodied in
criminal law] is most likely to take place when citizens perceive the law as expressing society’s moral
condemnation of such conduct.”).
180
See, e.g., Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957,
1967 (2001) (noting that “the logical prerequisite to moral education is a threshold level of social
consensus that the prosecution process is itself legitimate,” yet “[a]t present, a large proportion of the
populations of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda may not see the tribunals as sufficiently legitimate
to heed the moral lessons the tribunals seek to teach”); Wippman, supra note 161, at 486 (“Serbs, for
example, view the ICTY as biased, and might therefore refuse to accept its judgments as confirming
important social norms.”).
181
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 571–574.
182
Wippman, supra note 161, at 486.
183
Id. at 487 (internal quotation marks omitted).
184
Akhavan, Beyond Impunity, supra note 146, at 11 (“The focus of punishment should be the
179
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and to forestall, for example, the emergence of “failed states” or the
polarization of ethnic and national groups should be the principal focus of
international efforts. To the extent that ICL distracts from these objectives, it
is counterproductive. ICL would more effectively contribute to the process of
norm internalization and stabilization by maximizing its synergy with other
mutually reinforcing strategies, including communications, development
assistance, international human rights policy, the spread of liberal
constitutionalism and democracy, diplomacy, and economic incentives.
Analysis of the viability and coherence of deterrence in ICL thus
yields two overarching conclusions relevant to sentencing: First, it supports
Danner’s view, echoing H.L.A. Hart, that while deterrence may offer sound
reasons to establish an international criminal justice system, it provides scant
185
“guidance in determining the lengths of particular sentences.” Judges in the
international context, even more than in the national, lack sufficient, and
sufficiently reliable, information to assess logically the “costs and benefits of
186
imposing a sentence of any particular length in individual cases.”
Second,
punishment’s absolute severity in quantitative terms matters less than its
relative severity as an expression of the condemnation that attends particular
criminal acts under the circumstances. A sentence that local institutions and
actors view as cogent, legitimate, authoritative, and persuasive, one
disseminated to the broadest possible audience, may contribute to the longterm project of preventing ICL crimes through mediums other than direct
communication of a threat to potential criminals—for example, by its influence
on national jurisprudence, rules of conduct integrated into military manuals
distributed to soldiers, the media, and in the long term, the values and
perceptions that predominate “in the elite culture of international diplomacy as
187
well as world public opinion in general.”
B. Retribution
Retributive justifications for ICL punishment, while historically
predominant, emerge as problematic from several perspectives. Above all,
despite the prevalence of secular philosophical versions, retributivism—with
its characteristic discourse of “just deserts,” blameworthiness, and the
restoration of some moral balance—remains strongly redolent of religious
notions of justice ill-suited to a diverse international community of states and
188
And secular justifications for retributivism transposed to the ICL
peoples.
prevention of . . . deliberately induced aberrant contexts, within which habitually lawful social
relations degenerate into unrestrained violence,” for “[o]nce the population has fallen prey to a
collective psychosis of ethnic fear and hatred, violent behavior becomes exceedingly difficult to
circumscribe through threats of punishment.”).
185
Danner, supra note 1, at 447.
186
Id.; see also id. at 449 (“Without any empirical study, there is simply no reliable way to
determine how much deterrent effect a particular sentence will have, even assuming that marginal
differences in sentence length exert different deterrent effects.”).
187
Akhavan, Justice in the Hague, supra note 11, at 742.
188
See Greenawalt, supra note 6, at 347 (emphasizing that retributive sentiments “are often
supported by notions of divine punishment for those who disobey God’s laws,” or more generally, by
the notion that “punishment restores the moral order that has been breached by the original wrongful
act”).
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context make little sense largely because they presuppose a more coherent,
univocal, and stable community than international law offers.
1. Retribution as Vengeance Regulation
One prevailing legal-anthropological model of retribution—which
strictly speaking, should be regarded as a kind of utilitarianism—views it as a
189
“The criminal law,” in
socially condoned substitute for vengeance.
Stephen’s oft-quoted maxim, “stands to the passion of revenge in much the
190
same relation as marriage to the sexual appetite.”
Acts of retaliatory
violence, if left unchecked, threaten to destroy the social bonds of the
community. The institutions of criminal justice must therefore enable the
discharge of instinctual desires for vengeance in an orderly, socially palatable
manner. Punishment, on this view, is the means by which the state terminates
191
the otherwise escalating cycles of retaliatory violence within its community.
René Girard argues, for instance, that ritual sacrifice in ancient societies
prevented their self-destruction, precipitated by the escalation of cycles of
192
retaliatory violence.
The criminal law gradually assumes the role of
193
regulating private vengeance or, euphemistically, administering justice.
Failure to fulfill this function culminates in the chaotic discharge of retributive
instincts, characteristically in the form of large-scale violence.
The anthropological vision of escalating blood feuds and patterns of
collective violence conjured by Girard’s thesis resonates with our view of the
cataclysmic circumstances caused by war, chaotic collapse of the state, and
mass violence that characterize cases of widespread ICL violations like, for
example, the cycles of interethnic violence between Hutus and Tutsis in
194
Indeed, as
twentieth-century Rwanda or Croats and Serbs in the Balkans.
Arendt wrote, despite some perfunctory nods in the direction of deterrence,
Eichmann’s trial remained fundamentally about retribution in this theological,
189

HOLMES, supra note 160, at 35 (“It certainly may be argued, with some force, that it has never
ceased to be one object of punishment to satisfy the desire for vengeance.”). That retributivism may
originate in vengeance regulation does not mean that it must remain committed to the view that
“punishment of offenders satisfies the desires for vengeance of their victims” or that “punishment is
justified because without it vengeful citizens would take the law into their own hands,” for “the need
to prevent private violence . . . is an essentially utilitarian justification.” Michael S. Moore, The Moral
Worth of Retribution, in JEFFRIE G. MURPHY, PUNISHMENT AND REHABILITATION 94, 95 (Jeffrie G.
Murphy ed., 1995).
190
JAMES FITZJAMES STEPHEN, 1 HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 99 (London,
MacMillan 1883).
191
Archaic law codes consistently manifest a concern with vengeance regulation. See James Q.
Whitman, At the Origins of Law and the State: Supervision of Violence, Mutilation of Bodies, or
Setting of Prices, 71 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 41, 42 (1995).
192
See RENÉ GIRARD, VIOLENCE AND THE SACRED 8 (1972).
193
Id. at 15.
194
I do not mean to imply the oft-criticized view that the Rwandan genocide reflected no more
than the reemergence of historical or primordial ethnic animosity. Studies of the genocide uniformly
reject this view and emphasize the extent to which elites manipulated and exacerbated latent ethnic
tensions as a means to political power. See generally ALISON DESFORGES, LEAVE NONE TO TELL
THE STORY (1999); PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES (1998). Equally, most scholars reject the vision of the conflict in the
former Yugoslavia as the inevitable explosion of latent ethnic tensions between Bosnian Muslims,
Croats, and Serbs in the aftermath of the demise of Tito’s iron-fisted rule.
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quasi-talionic sense:
We refuse, and consider as barbaric, the propositions “that a
great crime offends nature, so that the very earth cries out for
vengeance; that evil violates a natural harmony which only
retribution can restore; that a wronged collectivity owes a duty
to the moral order to punish the criminal” (Yosal Rogat). And
yet I think it is undeniable that it was precisely on the ground
of these long-forgotten propositions that Eichmann was
brought to justice to begin with, and that they were, in fact, the
195
supreme justification for the death penalty.
Some prominent jurists and scholars ascribe a comparable function to the ad
196
hoc tribunals.
On reflection, however, this view of retribution as a response to
modern ethnic “blood feuds”—and arguably, therefore, a proper rationale for
ICL punishment—makes little sense. In the first place, the figurative nature of
the international community renders the paradigm inapposite. Retributive
197
views of punishment rooted in lex talionis, whether anthropological or
philosophical, depend on a conception of justice as a value that arises within a
single, coherent community. ICL, however, must mediate between the
interests of multiple communities, both literal and figurative, and international
tribunals generally lack the local legitimacy required as a practical matter to
discharge the anthropological function of vengeance regulation. They
represent the amorphous international community rather than the literal
“wronged collectivity,” that is, the particular local community purportedly
“unbalanced” by the crimes. The personnel, rules, and institutions that
comprise international tribunals conform to and promote international rather
than local legal, social, and moral norms. It is far from clear how punishment
by an international tribunal, which derives its authority from either treaty or a
Security Council resolution (at bottom, a function of state consent to the U.N.
Charter, itself a multilateral treaty), can be a legitimate proxy for the penal
interests of the literal victims who suffer extraordinary crimes of violence.
This disjuncture may well be a major reason that international tribunals often
suffer from a perceived lack of legitimacy in relation to affected local
communities or states.
And even were international tribunals able to act as proxies for
disabled local institutions, the collective nature of international crimes renders
the idea of punishment as the socialized discharge of communal instincts for
vengeance misguided at best: What sense does it make to speak of a “wronged
195

ARENDT, supra note 7, at 277.
E.g., International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, First Annual Report, ¶ 15, U.N. Doc.
A/49/342, S/1994/1007 (July 28, 1994) (report of then President of the ICTY Antonio Cassese)
(stating that the “only civilized alternative to this desire for revenge is to render justice,” lest “feelings
of hatred and resentment seething below the surface . . . , sooner or later, re-erupt and lead to renewed
violence”); see also Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1957,
1967–68 (2001)
197
But see Moore, supra note 189, at 94–95 (describing common misperceptions about
retribution, including that it necessarily implies some commitment to lex talionis).
196
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collectivity” where that very collectivity, in many cases, bears some culpability
or moral responsibility for the relevant wrong? We can see this problem more
clearly by turning to the conventional philosophical justifications for
retribution, which, unlike Girard’s anthropological vision, insist on the Kantian
maxim that punishment never be inflicted solely as a means to an extrinsic end:
198
order, vengeance regulation, and so forth.
2. The “Unfair Advantage” Thesis
A prominent philosophical variant of retributivism, the “unfair
199
advantage” or “benefits-and-burdens” thesis, justifies retribution by positing
a quasi-contractual relationship between individuals in a society. On this view,
punishment is “a debt owed to the law-abiding members of one’s community;
and, once paid, it allows re-entry into the community of good citizens on equal
200
Herbert Morris explains punishment similarly: The criminal law
status.”
specifies rules of conduct that benefit all members of a society while imposing
201
a corresponding burden of “self-restraint” on each; when a person violates
those rules, “he has something others have—the benefits of the system—but by
renouncing what others have assumed, the burdens of self-restraint, he has
acquired an unfair advantage. . . .
Justice—that is, punishing such
individuals—restores the equilibrium of benefits and burdens by taking from
202
the individual what he owes, that is, exacting a debt.”
These contractual models of retributive punishment, as the
exaction of a debt owed to society, also make little sense in the ICL context.
In the first place, it would be bizarre to conceptualize the génocidaire as a freerider on the hypothetical social contract of others not to destroy national,
203
ethnic, racial, or religious groups, or to regard a serious human rights abuser
as arrogating to himself a benefit that others voluntarily relinquished in their
204
common interest.
An economic view of criminal justice as redistributing
198

Kant famously wrote that “only the law of retribution (jus talionis) . . . can specify definitely
the quality and quantity of punishment; all other principles are fluctuating and unsuited for a sentence
of pure and strict justice because extraneous considerations are mixed into them.” IMMANUEL KANT,
THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 332 (Mary Gregor ed. & trans., Cambridge University Press 1991)
(1797).
199
See Andrew von Hirsch, Censure & Proportionality, in A READER ON PUNISHMENT 115, 116–
18 (Anthony Duff & David Garland eds. 1994) (overview and criticism of the “unfair advantage”
theory).
200
Jeffrie G. Murphy, Marxism and Retribution, 2 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 217 (1973).
201
Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 THE MONIST 475 (Oct. 1968).
202
Id. For criticism of the so-called “unjust advantage” theory of retribution, see von Hirsch,
supra note 199, at 116–18 & n.4. As von Hirsch notes, both Murphy and Morris have since backed
away from this view. Id. at 116, 130 n.2.
203
Genocide Convention, supra note 80, art. 2.
204
Retributive theories of the “unfair advantage” variety may offer a more coherent justification
for punishment of war crimes. It makes some sense to conceive of the laws of war as a body of
conduct agreed to by states for their mutual benefit. Violations, on this view, give rise to an
imbalance of benefits and burdens, which punishment rectifies. Indeed, the laws of war historically
recognized a practice redolent of this view, reprisals, whereby violations of the laws of war by one
state gave rise to a reciprocal right of the other state to engage in otherwise prohibited wartime
conduct. Punishment of individuals for war crimes might be conceived along similar lines as a means
of restoring the balance of benefits and burdens disturbed by violations of rules established for the
mutual benefit of combatants. In the modern era, however, this reciprocity rationale for the laws of
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benefits and burdens does not comport with our conception of crimes of
extraordinary brutality. Furthermore, conceptualizing the war criminal or
génocidaire as a deviant from social norms may make little sense where the
criminal conduct would be more accurately described as conforming to a norm
that prevails within the criminal’s literal community, be it national, ethnic,
205
racial, or martial.
Finally, the circumstances of widespread ICL violations frequently
involve the state not as the societal entity ensuring a just distribution of
benefits and burdens, but on the contrary, as a prime force disrupting that
distribution. The state, which in national criminal justice systems would be
conceived, on the retributivist view, as the obligee to which the criminal owes
a societal debt, emerges in the ICL context as an entity that may well share
culpability for the crime—for international crimes characteristically require the
collective cloak of authority that only the state or cognate entities (for example,
tribal authorities or paramilitaries) can confer on individuals. The paradigm of
retribution as a mechanism for restoring the balance of benefits and burdens
between society and its members therefore seems utterly misplaced as applied
to ICL crimes. To punish an individual perpetrator does not redistribute
benefits and burdens or avert blood feuds threatened by unharnessed cycles of
retaliatory vengeance, enabling a balancing of the communal scales or the
maintenance of order within a nation-state. In fact, as the Serbian reaction to
Milosevic’s trial by the ICTY suggests, international criminal trials may well
increase local dissonance and societal resentment within implicated nationstates and local communities, at least in the short term. The community that
authorizes punishment, in short, might not be the one to which the purported
societal debt is owed.
Retribution therefore emerges as a problematic justification for ICL
punishment in large part because it presupposes both a coherent community
and a relatively stable sociopolitical or legal order characterized by shared
values. The circumstances that enable widespread violations of international
humanitarian law and human rights atrocities generally involve the breakdown
of precisely that order. “Where no civil law is,” Hobbes wrote, “there is no
206
crime.”
C. Expressive Proportionality
The retributive paradigm also seems misplaced in the ICL context
because it apparently offers little guidance on proportionality. In a talionic
sense, of course, no punishment can fit the most horrendous international
crimes: slaughter of innocent civilians, systematic rape as a tool of war or
genocide, and so forth. At the same time, the circumstances of extraordinary
war would strike many as at least partially anachronistic. International human rights law has
reconceptualized international humanitarian law, in substantial part, as the human rights component of
the laws of war, a body of standards designed to guarantee minimal levels of human dignity and
decency even in times of systematic violence; hence modern international humanitarian law outlaws
reprisals in all circumstances.
205
See ARENDT, supra note 7, at 294–95; Drumbl, supra note 4, at 549–50, 567; Tallgren, supra
note 3, at 573–75.
206
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 190 (M. Oakshott ed., Basil Blackwell 1957) (1651).
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crime strain our intuitions about desert. Consider the well-known case of
Drazen Erdemović: What punishment, if any, befits a soldier who chose under
duress, a threat to his own life, to participate in the summary execution of
207
hundreds of Muslim civilians?
(Tellingly, the jurisprudential debate in
Erdemović focused less on speculation about deterrence—both the plurality
and the dissent agreed that their decisions would be unlikely to affect the
behavior of persons confronted with like circumstances in future conflicts—
than on the proper message to be expressed by the sentence.) This case, while
unique in the overt manner in which it highlights moral and legal issues that
ordinarily remain obscured by the sheer brutality of the crimes, raises
questions about the extent to which the criminal law can realistically regulate
brutal violence in circumstances where crime becomes, to some degree,
208
normative. For purposes of proportionality, the gravity of the harm caused
by an ICL violation seldom offers a particularly helpful metric; rather, context,
209
“the individual circumstances of the convicted person,” is crucial.
International human rights law implicitly adopts the key Kantian
principles that animate modern retributive theories: first, that punishment,
while it may also serve broader social goals, must never regard the punished
instrumentally in the first instance, as a mere means to an end; and second, that
culpability is at least a necessary, if not a sufficient, condition for
210
punishment. It therefore forbids, for example, exemplary justice, even if that
would better serve other legitimate penal objectives of the international
criminal justice system, such as deterrence. These principles impose
constraints on both the absolute and relative severity of punishment, cardinal
and ordinal proportionality. Of course, given the nature of the crimes at issue,
efforts to calibrate crime and punishment according to the lex talionis principle
would apparently require punishments that contemporary international human
211
rights law prohibits. What Beccaria wrote in relation to capital punishment
seems apt here: “If the passions, or the necessity of war, have taught men to
shed the blood of their fellow creatures, the laws, which are intended to
moderate the ferocity of mankind, should not increase it by examples of
212
ICL should be shaped, insofar as possible, to reinforce the
barbarity . . . .”
core norms that it shares with international human rights law. Retributivism of
the lex talionis variety has no place in this body of law.
But the expressive dimensions of retributivism nonetheless offer
proportionality guidance. Few contemporary retributivists defend a lex talionis
conception of proportionality. Andrew von Hirsch, for example, offers a
retributive conception of ordinal proportionality that is parasitic on the
213
expressive function of punishment. It does not posit an a priori notion of the
207

See generally Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-A (Oct. 7, 1997).
See generally Rosa Ehrenreich Brooks, Law in the Heart of Darkness: Atrocity and Duress, 43
VA. J. INT’L L. 861 (2003).
209
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 78, ¶ 1.
210
Moore, supra note 189, at 94.
211
Drumbl, supra note 4, at 581.
212
Cesare Beccaria, On Crimes and Punishments (1764), in READINGS IN JURISPRUDENCE AND
LEGAL PHILOSOPHY 346, 351 (Morris R. Cohen & Felix S. Cohen eds., 1951).
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von Hirsch, supra note 199, at 125.
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right penalty for different crimes, by reference to lex talionis or otherwise; it
requires only that more culpable crimes be more severely punished. While a
coherent ICL sentencing scheme requires some account of cardinal
proportionality, the question how to assign a baseline, an anchor against which
ICL crimes can be hierarchically ordered, seems less vital to the enterprise.
The arbitrary establishment, but consistent application, of cardinal guidelines
may be the best we can expect. It would be absurd to suppose that any
particular term of years represents the correct penalty for, say, grave breaches
of the Geneva Conventions.
One coherent, legitimate, and feasible basis for ordinal proportionality
in international sentencing, however, is expressive: Punishments should
convey the right degree of international condemnation relative to other
defendants within the jurisdiction of the relevant tribunal. To maintain its
legitimacy, an international tribunal must express censure, disapproval, and
condemnation equally across disparate local circumstances. Genocide should
not be punished more or less severely in Rwanda than in the former
Yugoslavia. This is emphatically not to say that every conviction for genocide
merits a sentence of equal length. The expressive value of a sentence—its
legitimacy and authority—depends on the extent to which it both embodies the
moral and legal norms of the authorizing community and fits the circumstances
of the offender in light of those norms.
Emphasizing the expressive function of punishment in the context of
ICL would enable tribunals to begin to address proportionality in a nonarbitrary way. No punishment, from a crude talionic perspective, can fit
serious human rights atrocities, and any effort to rationalize ordinal
proportionality on this basis would be doomed to futility. But from an
expressive perspective, we can make rational judgments of proportionality
consistent with a plausible concept of justice: “What justice demands is that
the condemnatory aspect of the punishment suit the crime . . . . [T]he degree
of disapproval expressed by the punishment should ‘fit’ the crime only in the
unproblematic sense that the more serious crimes should receive stronger
214
disapproval than the less serious ones . . . .”
Where, in an international context, criminal conduct becomes
normative, crimes by rank-and-file perpetrators should generally not be
deemed as blameworthy as those by the elites responsible for creating the
normative conditions conducive to those crimes. By reference to international
penal interests, for example, Duško Tadić’s harms obviously pale in
comparison with those of, say, Radovan Karadzic or Ratko Mladic. By
embracing an expressive account of proportionality and reorienting the metric
of retributivism to the penal interests of the international community, we can
begin to calibrate crime and punishment in ICL sentencing in a non-arbitrary
fashion notwithstanding that, emotively, virtually all of the relevant crimes
seem to demand the harshest penalties. For retribution, as for deterrence, the
principal value of ICL punishment therefore lies in its expressive
215
As the Appeals Chamber of the ICTY rightly emphasized,
dimensions.
214

FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 118.
Embracing an expressive function for ICL sentencing does not mean abandoning the sideconstraint imposed by justice or “just deserts” theories: that individuals not be treated solely as a
215
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retribution in ICL “is not to be understood as fulfilling a desire for revenge but
as duly expressing the outrage of the international community at these
216
crimes.”
D. Audience and Expressive Clarity
Critiques of expressivism in international criminal justice focus on the
217
What does even a comparatively long
potential distortion of the message.
prison term for genocide communicate to a victim if the otherwise applicable
national system would prescribe death for the same or an analogous crime?
And how well do the channels for punitive communication work between
218
international and national fora?
The expressive dimensions of punishment
depend on its ability to convey the right meaning against the background of
219
which vary significantly between the states,
particular social norms,
societies, cultures, and other constituencies that comprise the international
community. In part, the strong cross-cultural consensus that incarceration
expresses condemnation mitigates this problem. But the force of this
objection, in my judgment, counsels greater attention to communication and
public education strategies in ICL, a focus on making the ICL sentencing
process more effectively express the extraordinarily high level of international
condemnation of ICL crimes. Below, I suggest some potential steps that the
ICC, for example, might take in this direction.
Yet the effective communication that matters in the expressivist view
is not only that contained in the message to the convicted person or a potential
means to an extrinsic social end. To the contrary, the right to punish remains rooted in the
acknowledgment of human beings as moral agents. Modulating the degree of punishment for
expressive purposes—particularly once we recognize that no metaphysically correct term of
incarceration corresponds to the gravity of the harm—is not objectionable based on the Kantian
maxim.
216
Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Mar. 24, 2000); accord
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24, Judgment, ¶ 40 (July 31, 2003); see also Prosecutor v.
Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ¶ 484 (May 16, 2003); Prosecutor v. Rutaganda, Case No. ICTR96-3, ¶ 456 (Dec. 6, 1999) (penalties “show . . . that the international community shall not tolerate the
serious violations of international humanitarian law and human rights); Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case
No. IT-96-22-T, ¶ 20–21 (Mar. 5, 1998) (ICTY “a vehicle through which the international community
expresses its outrage at the atrocities committed in the former Yugoslavia”).
217
E.g., Alvarez, supra note 1, at 458 (arguing that “even if one were to agree that high
government officials’ actions, given their greater cumulative impact, merit graver punishment, this
message is compromised . . . by contemporaneous sentences being handed down by Rwandan courts,”
which “blunt the symbolic or deterrent value that exceptionalism seeks to achieve”); Danner, supra
note 1, at 491 n.310 (noting that “the validity of the expressive theory of punishment depends on
factors external to the punishment itself,” and that “[t]his problem has been especially acute in the
countries of the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda, where the media have either distorted the message or
failed to deliver it at all”); Drumbl, supra note 4, at 593 (arguing that “the expressive value of law and
punishment is weakened by selectivity and indeterminacy in the operationalization of law and
punishment, as well as the political contingency of the entire enterprise,” and that the expressive value
of punishment will frequently be “externalized from afflicted local communities owing to the distance
and mistrust evidenced between such communities and the machinery of international criminal
justice”); Tallgren, supra note 3, at 583 (arguing that cross-cultural and cross-national distinctions in
the severity and meaning of varying punishments interferes with the clarity of the message conveyed
by international criminal justice and may, to some audiences, even distort it in counterproductive
ways).
218
See Developments in the Law: International Criminal Law, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1943, 1971–72
& n.88 (2001).
219
See Kahan, supra note 17, at 597–601.
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future criminal. Expressivism, echoing Durkheim, focuses in part on the value
220
of punishment to the community itself,
in this case the figurative
international community. “The intended audience of such exhortations is not
just the wrongdoer of most concern to deterrence and retributive theorists. It is
also the Everyone of most interest to expressive theorists: the law-abider and
the lawmaker, the activist and the private citizen, and even the potential victim,
221
The expressive function of punishment serves the
today and tomorrow.”
communicator, not only the recipient of the punishment or the rogue states or
tyrannical leaders to whom it may convey a message. Like-minded lawabiding states and citizens—for example, those comprising the assembly of
states parties to the ICC—benefit from the affirmation of a common
commitment to international human rights norms and the rule of law, and the
sentencing process contributes to the formation of consensus on the propriety
222
Over time, punishment by
and meaning of different punishments.
international criminal tribunals can shape as well as express social norms. And
the international sentencing process can reinforce and vindicate those norms
even if it cannot, alone, realistically be expected to deter or fulfill retributive
aspirations held by each affected local constituency.
E. Rehabilitation: Literal, Societal, and Theological
International human rights law, as noted, emphasizes rehabilitation as
the paramount goal of punishment. Few, of course, expect war criminals to
repent after serving their sentences and return to duty as model soldiers, or
megalomaniacal elites to see the error of their ways and become benevolent
dictators or benign elected officials in the future. Nor do many worry about
recidivism, for “the likelihood of persons convicted [by international criminal
tribunals] ever again being faced with an opportunity to commit war crimes,
crimes against humanity, genocide or grave breaches is so remote as to render
223
Relative to ICL,
its consideration in this way unreasonable and unfair.”
rehabilitation, conceived in crime-control rather than humanistic terms, seems
an inapposite goal. Perhaps for that reason, for all its prominence in
international human rights law, it seldom receives attention in judicial
224
judgments or scholarly analyses of the goals of international sentencing. In
an early judgment, the ICTY said that “it would seem that the particularities of
crimes falling within the jurisdiction of the International Tribunal rule out
225
consideration of the rehabilitative function of punishment.”
220

EMILE DURKEHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., Free Press,
1984) (1893).
221
Amann, supra note 48, at 124.
222
See Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 516.
223
Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Case No., IT-96-23-T & IT-96-23/1-T, ¶ 840 (Feb. 22, 2001).
224
A notable exception is Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16.
225
Prosecutor v. Erdemović, Case No. IT-96-22-T, ¶ 66 (Nov. 29, 1996). Rehabilitative
considerations may nonetheless have tacitly influenced the Tribunal’s ultimate sentencing
determination. Schabas, A Human Rights Approach, supra note 16, at 505 (observing that “despite the
theory, the Trial Chamber appears to have imposed a sentence that is fundamentally clement, that
appropriately considers a host of mitigating factors, and that notably takes into account the fact that
the condemned man is remorseful and a good candidate for rehabilitation”).
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The ICTY has since recognized rehabilitation as a potential objective
of ICL punishment but described it in quasi-religious terms redolent of Martin
226
Buber: “[T]he process of coming face-to-face with the statements of victims,
if not the victims themselves, can inspire—if not reawaken—tolerance and
understanding of ‘the other,’ thereby making it less likely that if given an
opportunity to act in a discriminatory manner again, an accused would do so.
227
As this passage
Reconciliation and peace would thereby be promoted.”
makes clear, the idea of rehabilitation encompasses several distinct goals, some
more relevant to, or practicable for, ICL sentencing than others.
Rehabilitation traditionally implied a social vision of the criminal as
metaphorically if not literally sick and therefore in need of treatment. This
medical model fell out of favor in the 1970s and 1980s, in large part,
philosophically, because of its perceived denial of autonomy and moral
228
Rehabilitation of
agency, and practically, because of its perceived failure.
the medical model variety finds virtually no expression or support in the
judgments of the ad hoc tribunals. Given the body of literature emphasizing
the need to appreciate that psychosocial circumstances cause or contribute to
collective crimes of extraordinary hatred and violence, this omission seems
odd, even ironic. Many rank-and-file perpetrators of ICL crimes, on this view,
should be conceived not as inherently evil but as average, all-too-human
individuals who fell victim to manipulation by elites, rendering them
metaphorically sick with irrational fear, nationalist passion, or hatred. Many
Bosnian Serbs, for example, were indoctrinated to believe that their Muslim
neighbors, with foreign help, were poised to wage an imminent jihad against
them and thus saw their crimes against Bosnian Muslims as self-defense.
Plausibly, under ordinary circumstances, they would not have been inclined to
commit crimes, let alone war crimes or crimes against humanity.
Today, the ICC faces the question of how to deal justly with rebel
soldiers of the LRA abducted as children and indoctrinated through example
and extraordinarily brutal conditioning, which over time desensitized them and
made them willing participants in terrible crimes, including mutilation, rape,
mass killing of civilians, and other ICL crimes. From a retributive perspective,
it defies our intuitions to assert that children in circumstances like these
deserve punishment; from a deterrent perspective, it would be absurd to
suppose that children abducted and indoctrinated by violent conditioning can
be significantly, if at all, deterred by the remote threat of prosecution. Nor will
deterrence as a project of gradual norm penetration make a difference in this
context; the normative universe in which children abducted by the LRA reach
the age of criminal responsibility (eighteen, according to international law)
destroys any habitual inhibitions against violence.
Realistically, the Prosecutor would be unlikely to go forward in these
229
circumstances.
But child soldiers of the LRA highlight the problematic
226

See generally MARTIN BUBER, I AND THOU (Walter Kaufmann trans. & ed. 1970).
Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Case No. IT-02-60/1-S, ¶ 93 (Dec. 2, 2003).
228
See generally FRANCIS A. ALLEN, THE DECLINE OF THE REHABILITATIVE IDEAL: PENAL
POLICY AND SOCIAL PURPOSE (1981); Robert Martinson, What Works? Questions and Answers About
Prison Reform, PUB. INT., Spring 1974.
229
The ICC lacks personal jurisdiction over persons under the age of eighteen at the time of the
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230

nature of moral responsibility in the ICL context. Arguably, some rank-andfile participants in serious international crimes can to some degree be likened
to this extreme case—hence the recurrent emphasis in the critical literature on
social psychology and collective responsibility issues. On the one hand, as
emphasized, it would be a mistake to assimilate all war criminals to this vision.
But it would be just as mistaken to ignore the extent to which history and
research show that “acts of exceptional cruelty can indeed be committed by
231
‘ordinary people’ under special circumstances.” We have no reason to think,
to take a hyperbolic case, that someone guilty of summary executions in the
context of a brutal civil war, with atrocities committed on all sides, would be a
serial killer in a relatively stable, peacetime society. Some low-level
perpetrators may be suitable candidates for rehabilitation, and it would be
contrary to the spirit if not the letter of international human rights law to refuse
to consider mitigation in such cases.
Undoubtedly, rehabilitative
considerations will in some cases conflict with the retributive penal interests of
the victims. Where such conflicts exist, justice and the proper scope of
international penal interests, including the synergy between ICL and
international human rights norms, should prevail. The extent to which
collective psychosocial factors should be deemed to mitigate culpability can
be—and, I believe, should be—addressed at the sentencing stage, where
considerations of factual guilt no longer impair a more searching inquiry into
the relative culpability of particular defendants acting under diverse
circumstances.
Rehabilitation in this literal sense, however, has received far less
attention than the idea, again based on a questionable analogy, that
international criminal justice can contribute to the figurative “rehabilitation” of
communities riven by ethnic strife, war, a history of human rights atrocities,
232
and so forth. Many see this potential goal as a function of the individuation
of guilt ostensibly fostered by ICL: “Blame should not rest on an entire nation
but should be assigned to individual perpetrators of crimes and the responsible
233
leaders.” To punish individuals, on this view, can absolve others as well as
relevant offense, Rome Statute, art. 26, and the Statute gives the Prosecutor discretion to decline to
investigate where despite “the gravity of the crime and interests of victims, there are nonetheless
substantial reasons to believe that investigation would not serve the interests of justice.” Rome
Statute, supra note 4, arts. 26, 53(c).
230
See Chen Reis, Trying the Future, Avenging the Past: The Implications of Prosecuting
Children for Participating in Internal Armed Conflict, 28 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 629 (1997).
231
Tallgren, supra note 3, at 574; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 569.
232
E.g., TINA ROSENBERG, THE HAUNTED LAND: FACING EUROPE’S GHOSTS AFTER
COMMUNISM xviii (1995) (“Nations, like individuals, need to face up to and understand traumatic past
events before they can put them aside and move on to a normal life.”); Fletcher & Weinstein, supra
note 8, at 597 (“The transitional justice literature is replete with discussion of the need for societies to
‘heal’ after mass violence.”); Turner, supra note 38, at 27.
233
THEODOR MERON, The Case for War Crimes Trials in Yugoslavia, in WAR CRIMES LAW
COMES OF AGE 187, 196 (1998); see also Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 598 & n.87 (noting
that a broad spectrum of scholars and jurists, including Karl Jaspers, Antonio Cassese, Payam
Akhavan, and Aryeh Neir embrace some variant of the view “that holding individuals accountable for
[ICL crimes] alleviates collective guilt by differentiating between the perpetrators and innocent
bystanders, thus promoting reconciliation”); Richard J. Goldstone, Fifty Years After Nuremberg: A
New International Criminal Tribunal for Human Rights Criminals, in CONTEMPORARY GENOCIDES:
CAUSES, CASES, CONSEQUENCES 215 (Albert J. Jonman ed. 1996); Jelena Pejic, Creating an
Permanent International Criminal Court: The Obstacles to Independence and Effectiveness, 29
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 291, 292 (1998).
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the collective society from which they originate, enabling its reintegration into
the figurative international community—as, for example, when the United
Nations welcomed Yugoslavia back after its surrender of Milosevic to the
ICTY.
Unfortunately, these views rest on questionable “theological and
medical models” that have “solidified into articles of faith” rather than
234
Studies of the effect of the Nuremberg trials on
experience or research.
235
postwar Germans, for example, remain inconclusive at best, and scant
evidence suggests that this project of collective absolution has worked in either
Bosnia or Rwanda. In fact, in Serbia, reports indicate that the prosecution of
Milosevic, far from delegitimizing him, has been perceived as a reflection of
international persecution of Serbs, emboldening Serbian nationalists. Within
states, as the South African experience shows, truth commissions may well be
more effective at achieving collective rehabilitation. ICL, at least as applied
by international tribunals, is not particularly well-tooled to pursue societal
rehabilitation.
Furthermore, as several scholars emphasize, the liberal presumption
against collective guilt biases us against and obscures the almost invariable
collective element of ICL crimes, which casts doubt on a criminal law
paradigm that hermetically separates the guilty from the innocent. At times,
the state or another collective entity does bear blame or responsibility, even if
the relative culpability of different actors that comprise that collective entity
differs dramatically—from the passive acquiescence of the bystander to the
(reluctant or enthusiastic) participation of the rank-and-file perpetrator to the
236
deliberate incitement of the demagogue.
Above all, perhaps, we should recognize that while aspirations about
reconciliation and national healing may at times be laudable by-products of
international criminal justice, they do not count as self-sufficient reasons to
sentence a particular perpetrator more or less severely. Similarly, we can
debate the plausibility, validity, or propriety of the Security Council’s assertion
that establishing the ad hoc tribunals will contribute to the restoration of
international peace and security. But it would be odd, if not inappropriate, to
sentence someone to more or less time in prison based solely on this aspiration.
The Rome Statute expresses these goals in its preamble but rightly, in my
view, says nothing about them in its provisions on sentencing.
CONCLUSION: INTERNATIONAL SENTENCING REFORM AND THE ROME
STATUTE
If the principal value served by ICL punishment is expressive, what
implications does this have for the substance and process of sentencing by
international criminal tribunals? I would suggest three: First and foremost,
234

Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 600–601.
See TONY JUDT, POSTWAR: A HISTORY OF EUROPE SINCE 1945 at 53–54, 58 (2005).
236
Fletcher & Weinstein, supra note 8, at 581; see also Drumbl, supra note 4, at 568; Fletcher,
supra note 11. Perhaps the most well-known exploration of these issues remains KARL JASPERS, THE
QUESTION OF GERMAN GUILT (1947).
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distinct sentencing hearings, which the ICTY abandoned for expedience,
should be reinstituted by the ICC and made an essential stage in the process of
237
international criminal justice, not an “afterthought.”
Second, the ICC and
ICL jurisprudence generally should develop—not rigid sentencing guidelines
238
of the kind brought into disrepute by the federal Sentencing Reform Act —
but a rational (if flexible) scheme to convey aggravating and mitigating factors,
which should take into account the defendant’s individual circumstances and
role relative to the state, military unit, or other collective entity implicated by
the crimes of conviction. Finally, international criminal tribunals should work
to enhance the expressive potential of sentencing by ensuring the widespread
publication and dissemination of judgments to the broadest possible audience
and by maximizing the level of cooperation and jurisprudential exchange
between national and international criminal justice institutions.
Sentencing, in international no less than national criminal law, should
239
be “a ritual of manifest moral significance.” Indeed, the formal expression
of communal condemnation assumes dramatic importance in ICL, where the
standard justifications for and goals ostensibly served by criminal
punishment—deterrence, retribution, rehabilitation, and incapacitation—seem
less plausible, legitimate or efficacious. Yet after a few early experiments with
240
holding a distinct sentencing phase, the ad hoc tribunals abandoned this
procedure by amendments to their internal rules, apparently based on
241
considerations of expedience and cost, and perhaps also on the unfamiliarity
of sentencing hearings to international judges from civil law states. Instead,
the tribunals now typically append their sentencing determinations to
voluminous written judgments, rendering them relatively obscure and
inaccessible to the public and largely eviscerating their distinctive symbolic
significance. Furthermore, because the tribunals tend to issue a single sentence
intended to cover the “totality of an accused’s conduct,” it becomes “difficult
242
This is
to determine the range of sentences for each specific crime.”
243
unfortunate, for “transactional” sentencing of this sort, however expedient,
impedes the growth of a mature sentencing jurisprudence that could provide
guidance to national courts, where, because of the principle of
complementarity and resource and other constraints, the bulk of future ICL
prosecutions will be held.
The expressive functions of punishment—its potential to indicate
authoritative disavowal of criminal conduct, signify non-acquiescence in the
crimes, vindicate international norms, and (perhaps) absolve ethnic or national
communities, as collectives, of guilt by inculpating individuals—depend on
237

Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 171.
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98–473, 98 Stat. 1987 (1984) (codified in
scattered sections of 18 U.S.C. and 28 U.S.C.).
239
STITH & CABRANES, supra note 19, at 81.
240
See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Akakeysu, Case No. ICTR-96-4-T, Sentencing Judgment (Oct. 2,
1998); Prosecutor v. Tadić, Case No. IT-94-I-T, Sentencing Judgment (July 14, 1997).
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Sean D. Murphy, Progress and Jurisprudence of the International Criminal Tribunal for the
Former Yugoslavia, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 57, 92 (1999).
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Prosecutor v. Semanza, Case No. ICTR-97-20, ¶ 562 (May 15, 2003).
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See Prosecutor v. Niyitegeka, Case No. ICTR-96-14, ¶ 483 (May 16, 2003).
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communication.
Sentences issued only in writing, tacked on to dense,
lengthy judicial decisions and unaccompanied by a public “ritual of manifest
moral significance” that expresses the reprobative judgments of the relevant
community, cannot fulfill these functions very effectively. The application of
ICL by international criminal tribunals will almost certainly remain in large
measure a symbolic exercise. Given resource and political constraints, the ad
hoc tribunals, the ICC, and future international tribunals will never be able to
function as a self-sufficient criminal justice system; they will never be able to
245
try more than a fraction of the perpetrators. It is the symbolic value—not the
number—of convictions that matters most to the goals that sentencing by these
tribunals can realistically be expected to fulfill.
Of course, given the gravity of most ICL crimes, juxtaposed against
the constraints on the kind and degree of punishment imposed by international
human rights law, one might reasonably question the ability of any sentence of
incarceration to “duly express[] the outrage of the international community at
246
In part, this problem is insoluble: The normative goals of
[ICL] crimes.”
international human rights law impair the ability of punishment to accurately
express the extraordinary global condemnation, anger, and retributive
sentiments that these crimes elicit, particularly where the punitive norms of
affected local communities would indicate a more severe penalty. The
expressive value of punishment may, however, be enhanced not only by
substantive changes in the severity of punishment but by considering how
247
more effectively to make the “process the punishment,” particularly for the
elites on which the ICC intends to focus. A sentencing hearing would enable
experimentation in this regard.
What would such a hearing involve? In bare outline, both the defense
and the prosecution should surely be given an opportunity to make formal
submissions with relevant mitigating and aggravating circumstances,
248
including, where appropriate, psychological and other expert testimony.
Furthermore, tribunals should consider adopting the familiar practice of having
an independent official prepare a presentencing report, which would explore,
as the Rome Statute instructs, “the individual circumstances of the convicted
249
Because of the collective nature of ICL crimes, and the often
person.”
dramatically different normative universe in which the perpetrators act,
developing a sentencing process and jurisprudence that distinguishes different
categories of defendants based on their status, role, and background seems not
250
only appropriate but essential to the legitimacy of the enterprise.
And
244

See FEINBERG, supra note 17, at 101–05, 115.
Wippman, supra note 161, at 480.
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Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Case No. IT-95-14/1, Judgment, ¶ 185 (Mar. 24, 2000); accord
Prosecutor v. Stakic, Case No. IT-97-24, Judgment, ¶ 40 (July 31, 2003).
247
MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER
CRIMINAL COURT (1979).
248
See William A. Schabas, Article 76: Sentencing, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 979, 981–82 (Otto Triffterer ed. 1999) [hereinafter Schabas,
Article 76: Sentencing] (noting that the “ad hoc Tribunals have considered relevant information to
include psychiatric and psychological reports, as well as testimony by the convicted person”).
249
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 78, ¶ 1; see Beresford, supra note 43, at 52.
250
Regrettably, the “current case law of the Tribunal does not evidence a discernible pattern of
245
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despite the bad press generated by the (until recently, mandatory) federal
sentencing guidelines, the adoption of genuine sentencing guidelines by
international tribunals would be a significant step toward rationalizing the
251
sentencing process, particularly in cases of multiple convictions. Finally, a
focus on the expressive value of punishment counsels public pronouncement of
the sentence, perhaps even of the hearing itself, disseminated to as broad an
252
audience as possible.
The Rome Statute offers a unique opportunity to refocus attention on
the significance of sentencing to the goals of ICL. Like its predecessor
instruments, it says little about sentencing. But the positive-law framework
created by the statute lends itself to a judicial interpretive process that could
more effectively serve the expressive dimensions of punishment. Article 77
authorizes the Court to impose a specified term of imprisonment not to exceed
thirty years except where a life sentence is “justified by the extreme gravity of
253
the crime and the individual circumstances of the convicted person.” Article
78 instructs the Court to determine sentences by taking “into account such
factors as the gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances of the
254
convicted person.” Rule 145 of the draft Rules of Procedure and Evidence,
however, goes beyond the minimal provisions of the ICTY and ICTR statutes,
enumerating with greater specificity relevant aggravating and mitigating
factors, including:
the harm caused to the victims and their families, the nature of
the unlawful behaviour and the means employed to execute the
crime; the degree of participation of the convicted person; the
degree of intent; the circumstances of manner, time and
location; and the age, education, social and economic condition
255
of the convicted person.
the Tribunal imposing sentences on subordinates that differ greatly from those imposed on their
superiors.” Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33, ¶ 709 & n.1493 (Aug. 2, 2001); see also Drumbl,
supra note 4, at 583–84 (reviewing illustrative ICTY sentences). This is somewhat curious, for both
the ICTY and the ICTR have embraced in principle that elites should be sentenced more severely than
subordinates in the command structure, albeit subject to the significant proviso that the gravity of the
offense remains the paramount consideration. See Prosecutor v. Musema, Case No. ICTR-96-13-A,
Appeals Chamber, ¶¶ 382–83 (Nov. 16, 2001). The adjustments under the U.S. Federal Sentencing
Guidelines for “organizer or leader,” “manager or supervisor,” “minor participant” and “minimal
participant” would likely prove too crude for this purpose, but they suggest one plausible way to
provide some structure to this dimension of ICL sentencing. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL
§§ 3B1.1, 3B1.2 (2004). To establish gradations for different types of offenders need not imply low
sentences for all rank-and-file perpetrators. See Prosecutor v. Delalic, Case No. IT-96-21-A, ¶ 847
(Feb. 20, 2001) (“In certain circumstances, the gravity of the crime may be so great that even
following consideration of any mitigating factors, and despite the fact that the accused was not senior
in the so-called overall command structure, a very severe penalty is nevertheless justified.”); accord
Musema, supra, ¶¶ 382–83.
251
See Beresford, supra note 43, at 82–86.
252
See, e.g., JUDT, supra note 235, 53 (“The main Nuremberg Trial was broadcast twice daily on
German radio, and the evidence it amassed would be deployed in schools, cinemas and reeducation
centers throughout the country.”); Schabas, Article 76: Sentencing, supra note 248, at 983 (noting that
the ICTR broadcast in Rwanda a summary of the Akayesu judgment).
253
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 77(1).
254
Id. art. 78, ¶ 1.
255
Report of the Preparatory Commission for the International Criminal Court, Finalized draft
text of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Nov. 2, 2000, Rule 145(1)(c) (“Determination of
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This emphasis on context, role, and circumstances is further reinforced
by the inclusion, as one of two explicit mitigating factors, of “circumstances
falling short of constituting grounds for exclusion of criminal responsibility,
256
such as substantially diminished mental capacity or duress.” Together, these
provisions offer a positive-law framework that can be construed to recognize
the potential mitigating role of context and the collective nature of ICL crimes
for rank-and-file perpetrators “who allowed themselves to be drawn into a
257
maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly.” Rule 145(2)(b), conversely, can be
construed to address those “who initiated or aggravated” the “maelstrom of
258
violence,” an aggravating factor reflected in the sentencing jurisprudence of
the ad hoc tribunals and now codified in the Rome Statute as “[a]buse of power
259
or official capacity.” This construction also has the virtue of offering some
guidance in interpreting Article 78’s authorization of life imprisonment “when
justified by the extreme gravity of the crime and the individual circumstances
260
of the convicted person,” for Rule 145(3) speaks of the conditions for a life
sentence being “evidenced by the existence of one or more aggravating
261
circumstances.”
Most significantly, the Rome Statute, unlike its predecessors,
262
presumptively “establishes the principle of a distinct sentencing phase.” This
represents a significant innovation not only because of its capacity to enhance
the expressive value of ICL, but also because, as in the national context, the
“failure to hold a separate sentencing hearing may put the accused at a real
263
disadvantage during the trial.” Of course, international criminal tribunals do
not confront these issues in the constitutional context of the Sixth Amendment
right to trial by jury. But similar due process tensions exist: A defendant may,
Sentence”), PCNICC/200/1/Add.1 (2000) [hereinafter ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence].
256
Id. Rule 145(2)(a)(i). The other enumerated mitigating circumstance reflects concerns
extrinsic to culpability, the “person’s conduct after the [criminal] act, including any efforts by the
person to compensate the victims and any co-operation with the Court.” Id. Rule 145(2)(a)(ii).
257
See Prosecutor v. Krstic, Case No. IT-98-33-T, Judgment, ¶ 711 (Aug. 2, 2001).
258
Id.
259
ICC Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 145(2)(b)(ii).
260
Rome Statute, supra note 4, art. 78(2).
261
The ICTR alluded to these role-based aggravating and mitigating factors but, in my view,
seriously misapplied them in a recent judgment. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, a senior pastor at the
Mugonero Complex, betrayed his parishioners, some of whom had actively sought his help during the
genocide, by leading attackers to their hiding place, pointing out Tutsi refugees attempting to flee, and
encouraging and inciting the attackers to kill them. While the Trial Chamber nominally emphasized
“abuse of trust” as an aggravating factor, see Prosecutor v. Elizaphan Ntakirutimana, Case No. ICTR96-10, ¶¶ 900–04 (Feb. 21, 2003), it gave grossly undue weight to evidence that “Ntakirutimana was
essentially a person of good moral character until the events of April to July 1994 during which he
was swept along with many Rwandans into criminal conduct,” id. ¶ 895, and therefore sentenced him
to only ten years for genocide. Ntakirutimana, a mature and well-educated church elder who (as the
evidence cited by the Trial Chamber makes clear) fully understood the wrongfulness of his conduct,
see id., is hardly the kind of rank-and-file participant whose punishment should be mitigated because
he found himself “swept along with many Rwandans,” or as the Krstic court put it, because he
“allowed [himself] to be drawn into a maelstrom of violence, even reluctantly.” Prosecutor v. Krstic,
Case No. IT-98-33, Judgment, ¶ 711 (Aug. 2, 2001).
262
Schabas, Article 76: Sentencing, supra note 248, at 979.
263
Id. at 981; cf. Apprendi v. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466, 557 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[T]o
require jury consideration of all such factors—say, during trial where the issue is guilt or innocence—
could easily place the defendant in the awkward (and conceivably unfair) position of having to deny
he committed the crime yet offer proof about how he committed it.”).
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for example, wish to introduce evidence in mitigation but hesitate to relinquish
264
the right to remain silent and the privilege against self-incrimination.
The
absence of a distinct sentencing stage in ICL may also threaten to compromise
judicial neutrality, for evidence relevant only to sentencing—often of a highly
inflammatory nature—must then be introduced at trial, where it may interfere
with even the most professional judge’s ability to weigh the evidence relevant
265
only to guilt or innocence dispassionately. The recent proliferation of guilty
pleas before international tribunals makes a distinct sentencing phase all the
more crucial.
From a long-term perspective, a focus on the expressive capacity of
punishment counsels greater attention to how law-abiding states and citizens,
not only rogue states and the punished, perceive sentencing in international
criminal law. The adoption of the Rome Statute itself prompted a number of
states “to incorporate prohibitions on genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity into their criminal statutes,” lest the ICC “find them ‘unable’ to
266
prosecute international crimes.” ICC sentencing judgments, like the statute
itself, hold a similar potential to influence the practice and policy of states by
acting as an engine of jurisprudential and normative development where it
267
matters the most, within nation-states.
Any account of international sentencing must be realistic about its
ability to achieve the ambitious and diverse goals ascribed to it. But far from
being “of secondary importance in the overall scheme of international
268
justice,” as it has historically been treated, sentencing is as vital to the values
and goals of ICL as adjudication. As the ICC begins to investigate and
prosecute its first cases, it should bear in mind that the Rome Statute’s explicit
provision for sentencing hearings offers an opportunity to reinvigorate and
jurisprudentially develop the law and process of ICL sentencing, an overdue
imperative. The beginnings of a “common law” of ICL sentencing, based on
the judgments of the ad hoc tribunals and, to a lesser extent, hybrid and
national courts applying ICL, provide a foundation on which to build.
International criminal tribunals must develop coherent, fair, and principled
sentencing practices, for their long-term success depends in part on the extent
to which the social institution of punishment can be shaped to reflect, pursue,
269
and in time, one hopes, justify their substantial costs.
264

Schabas, Article 76: Sentencing, supra note 248, at 981.
See Andrew N. Keller, Punishment for Violations of International Criminal Law: An Analysis
of Sentencing at the ICTY and ICTR, 12 IND. J. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 53, 69–73 (2001) (arguing that
the introduction of evidence relevant only to sentencing at the trial of Radislav Krstic compromised
the ICTY’s perceived legitimacy).
266
See ICC, Office of the Prosecutor, Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the
Prosecutor 3 (Sept. 2003) (“The existence of the Court has already encouraged States to incorporate as
domestic law the crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”); see also Turner, supra note 38, at 8–9
& n.38 (also describing how Germany enacted domestic legislation to prosecute offenders in the wake
of the First World War to avoid threats of an international tribunal). Sudan began, albeit likely in bad
faith, to establish institutions for the domestic adjudication of ICL violations in the months
culminating in referral of the situation of Darfur to the ICC.
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See Jonathan I. Charney, International Criminal Law and the Role of Domestic Courts, 95
AM. J. INT’L L. 120, 123 (2001); Alvarez, supra note 1, at 483.
268
Schabas, International Sentencing, supra note 1, at 171.
269
See The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General, The Rule of Law and
Transitional Justice in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies, ¶ 42, U.N. Doc. S/2004/616* (Aug. 23,
265

94

STANFORD JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

43:39

2004), (noting that the “two ad hoc tribunals have grown into large institutions, with more than 2,000
posts between them and a combined annual budget exceeding a quarter of a billion dollars—
equivalent to more than 15 percent of the [United Nations] Organization’s total regular budget,” and
that “[a]lthough trying complex legal cases of this nature would be expensive for any legal system and
the tribunals’ impact and performance cannot be measured in financial numbers alone, the stark
differential between cost and number of cases processed does raise important questions”); Ralph
Zacklin, The Failings of Ad Hoc International Tribunals, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 541, 545 (2004).

